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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the policy preferences of domestic producerswho
are seekingprotection from foreignmultinational corporations (MNCs) in their
home market. By focusing on the policy demands of domestic producers, this
dissertation aims to explain the variation in inward foreign direct investment
(FDI) regulations across industries within a country. I argue that industry fea-
tures and FDI market entry strategies, both of which contribute to a disruption
of the market equilibrium, have critical roles in shaping domestic producers’
attitudes toward restrictions on inward FDI. I provide evidence of this theory
in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.
In Chapter 2, “Protection from FDI and Economies of Scale," I demonstrate
how industry features define the degree of market competition and affect do-
mestic firms’ preferences regarding inward FDI. Economies of scale that are
internal to the firm lead to industrial concentration and radical changes in in-
dustries if one firm supersedes another; external economies of scale lead to
geographic concentration and disruptive changes in location if one country’s
industrial growth surpasses that of another. I propose that these effects are
decisive in shaping domestic producers’ attitudes toward restrictions on FDI.
Industries with high internal economies of scale are likely to pressure their
government to impose higher restrictions on inbound FDI to avoid fierce new
competition; industries with high external economies of scale are more likely
x
to welcome FDI to consolidate their country as a production hub. I develop
these insights in a formal model of the endogenous barriers to foreign invest-
ments and examine data on barriers to FDI across different industries in 36
OECD countries. I include evidence for both patterns, as economies of scale
are a significant industrial feature for understanding the variation in barriers
to FDI across industries and countries.
In Chapter 3, “FDI Entry Modes and the Demand for Regulations on In-
ward FDI," I provide evidence that FDI market entry modes are also important
in shaping the preferences of domestic producers regarding inward FDI. I ex-
amine the relationship between the choice of FDI entry modes and inward FDI
regulations in high-income countries from the perspective of domestic firms.
I posit that domestic firms in industries with more greenfield investments de-
mand stricter FDI regulations from their government, while domestic firms
in industries with more cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) de-
sire looser FDI regulations. Domestic firms are favorable to cross-border M&A
deals becauseM&As often involve no new entries or significant technology and
information spillovers. However, these firms oppose greenfield investment
projects that bring new, large-scale entries without positive spillover effects. By
examining the FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index of the 36 OECD member
states, I reveal that industries with more cross-border M&As have lower FDI
restrictiveness, while industries with more greenfield investments have higher
FDI restrictiveness. Thus, FDI regulation policy reflects how different types of
FDI entry modes affect domestic producers.
xi
Finally, in Chapter 4, “Disguised Protectionism: Competition Laws andNa-
tional Security Policies as Barriers to Cross-Border M&As," I present evidence
that governments actively utilize policy tools to protect domestic producers
from foreign MNCs. I argue that domestic firms and industries seek insu-
lation, similar to international trade, from profit-lowering international com-
petition by securing restrictions on M&As by foreign firms. Because of lim-
its on overt restrictions of FDIs, potential host governments are incentivized
to employ subtler forms of restrictions. I focus on two main types of regu-
lations that govern M&A activities: competition policies (or antitrust regula-
tions) and national security reviews. I present that both types of regulations
discourage cross-border M&As led by foreign global parents more substan-
tially than cross-border M&As led by domestic global parents. I therefore con-
clude that governments of developed countries utilize competition laws and
national security regulations to protect domestic firms. This paper explores an
infrequently addressed topic in international political economy, the politics of
cross-border M&As, demonstrating that regulatory standards in this area are
politicized to defend narrow economic interests.
Collectively, these chapters indicate that industry features and FDI entry
modes are critical factors that shape domestic producers’ preferences over FDI
regulation policies. Additionally, governments are more sensitive to domestic
producers’ demands and are more likely to utilize policy tools to protect their
interests. The findings in this dissertation have important implications for both
academia and the real world. In the field of political science, this focus on in-
xii
dustry features andMNCs’ market entry strategies, which are both critical fea-
tures of FDI, has considerable potential for future research in the international
political economy scholarship. Researchers must develop theories regarding
why barriers to FDI vary dramatically across both industries and countries.
Furthermore, this research directly reflects the rise of protectionism in contem-
porary international relations. While inward FDI regulations have been sub-
tle in developed countries, the intensifying security competition between the
United States and China as well as the global competition for high-tech lead-
ership have caused countries to begin to adopt barriers against inward FDI.
Although these barriers may benefit the domestic national champion firms in
the short run, preventing fair competition between domestic and foreign firms




Multinational corporations (MNCs) have actively engaged in global business in the 21st
century, thus driving the globalization process. When MNCs build plants or open of-
fices in foreign countries, these transnational activities are referred to as foreign direct
investments (FDI). These long-term investments include ownership control by the firm
that makes the investment. FDI typically follows two forms: either opening a production
facility from the ground up (greenfield investments) or acquiring an existing foreign firm
(cross-border mergers and acquisitions [CBM&As]). The occurrence of FDI has escalated
significantly since 1990, and while FDI recessions have transpired, the general trend of
FDI has continued to increase.
FDI not only brings valuable capital to the host country but also creates jobs and are
a key channel for technology and information transfers. Thus, the bulk of existing re-
search on FDI focuses on the political determinants of inward FDI. Furthermore, govern-
ments actively sign international pacts, such as bilateral investment treaties or free trade
agreements, to attract more foreign MNCs to their countries. Concurrently, however, gov-
ernments also enact significant barriers on FDI entering the local market. Notably, these
barriers are only observed in certain industries, while other industries are completely open
to foreign investors. Where is the domestic firms’ pressure the strongest in resisting for-
eign investments? Furthermore, in which cases might local firms welcome investment by
1
foreign firms?
In this dissertation, I address these questions by examining the effects of FDI on the
domestic market equilibrium. I posit that industry features – defined as internal and ex-
ternal economies of scale – and two types of FDI entrymodes – greenfield investments and
CBM&As – are fundamental for understanding the variation in inward FDI regulations.
Moreover, I present evidence that governments utilize policy tools to restrict inward FDI
to protect the interests of domestic producers.
In “Protection from FDI and Economies of Scale" (Chapter 2), I establish that internal
and external economies of scale are critical drivers of the preferences of domestic pro-
ducers over inward FDI regulations. I propose that industries with high levels of internal
economies of scale (IEoS) are more likely to have stricter FDI regulations, whereas in-
dustries with high levels of external economies of scale (EEoS) are more likely to have
loose FDI regulations. In IEoS industries, domestic firms pressure their government to
impose higher FDI restrictions on inbound FDI to avoid fierce new competition. Con-
versely, in EEoS industries, domestic firms are more likely to welcome FDIs to consolidate
their country as a production hub.
To demonstrate the effects of economies of scale on market equilibrium, I present a
formal model of the endogenous barriers to FDI. Numeric simulations indicate that the
increase in each firm’s ability to reduce costs through firm-level growth (IEoS) increases
FDI restrictions, while an increase in each firm’s ability to reduce costs through industry-
level growth (EEoS) decreases FDI restrictions. Additionally, by examining data on the
inbound FDI restrictiveness of each OECD member country, I uncover evidence that in-
dustries with high IEoS are associatedwith stricter FDI regulations, while EEoS industries
are associated with looser FDI regulations. These results suggest that economies of scale
are a crucial industrial feature for understanding the variation in barriers to FDI across
industries.
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Moreover, I examine the effect of FDI market entry modes on the restrictiveness of
FDI regulations. In “FDI Entry Modes and the Demand for Regulations on Inward FDI"
(Chapter 3), I focus on the different types of FDI entry modes and how each type affects
domestic producers. I propose that FDI regulations, which reflect the preferences of do-
mestic producers regarding inward FDI, are stricter in industries with more greenfield
investments and looser in industries with more CBM&As because greenfield investments
are more likely to increase market competition relative to CBM&As. Existing domestic
firms in industries with more greenfield investment projects demand protection from for-
eign MNCs to maintain their domestic market dominance.
Utilizing the FDI restrictiveness index data, I present evidence that industries with
more CBM&As relative to greenfield investments are associated with lower FDI restric-
tiveness, while industries with more greenfield investments relative to CBM&As are as-
sociated with higher FDI restrictiveness. Therefore, the type of FDI entry mode is impor-
tant in determining domestic firms’ preferences regarding inward FDI policy. Therefore,
a foreign MNC’s decision regarding entry mode is a key determinant of domestic firms’
preferences over inward FDI policy.
In the following chapter, “Disguised Protectionism: Competition Laws and National
Security Policies as Barriers to Cross-BorderM&As" (Chapter 4), I investigate howgovern-
ments utilize policy tools to protect domestic producers. Consistent with the arguments
in Chapters 2 and 3, domestic firms are against FDI that increases local market compe-
tition, so they pressure their government for protection. Host governments, in turn, are
more susceptible to the demands of domestic producers than other constituencies – such as
consumers, laborers, and foreign firms – because domestic producers have more means
and resources to influence the government’s policymaking. Consequently, host govern-
ments are incentivized to employ policy tools that are less conspicuous to avoid violating
the international treaties they have signed regarding FDI liberalization.
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To test this theory, I focus on two types of FDI regulations: competition laws (or an-
titrust laws) and national security reviews, which are particularly significant to CBM&As.
Since competition laws restrict M&A activities that may hinder fair competition (e.g., mo-
nopolies or price collusion), the regulations should be imposed equally onM&A activities
by domestic and foreign firms. Likewise, if national security reviews are strictly about na-
tional security, then the regulations should not be applied in industries that are not secu-
rity sensitive. However, by examining the effects of both types of regulations on CBM&As,
I have found that competition laws disproportionately discourage M&As that involve for-
eign global parents as compared toM&Aswith domestic global parents, even in industries
that are seemingly not related to security. Therefore, I posit that governments of developed
countries utilize subtle measures to protect domestic firms from competition with foreign
firms.
The theory and findings in this dissertation offer three main contributions to research
on the politics of FDI. First, I develop a rigorous theory by highlighting the effect of in-
dustry features, FDI market entry modes, and market competition on the regulatory re-
strictiveness of inward FDI. Consequently, I illuminate areas that have been understudied
in the IPE literature. Bringing insights from literatures in business and economics, this
dissertation provides a new theoretical framework – focusing on IEoS and EEoS – to un-
derstand why FDI regulations exist in certain industries. Moreover, by employing the per-
spective of domestic producers, I illustrate that a change in domestic market competition
significantly affects domestic producers’ preferences.
Second, I emphasize a relatively neglected topic in IPE: the politics of CBM&As. De-
spite the significance of CBM&As in developed countries, the majority of studies in IPE
literature have treated FDI as a whole instead of disaggregating into two entry modes.
However, since the economic impact of the two entry modes are completely different, it is
important to separate them in the empirical analysis. This dissertation presents evidence
4
that the two FDI entry modes have different effects on FDI regulations and offers potential
areas of research that require further attention from IPE scholars.
Third, by focusing on developed countries, I highlight that discrimination against for-
eign MNCs is present even in the most globalized countries. Developing countries typ-
ically place barriers on inward FDI to protect domestic infant industries as an economic
development strategy; however, developed countries are typically open to international
economic activities. These countries have often signed numerous trade and investment
treaties to prevent protectionist behaviors. This dissertation, however, reveals that gov-
ernments of developed countries also may resort to protectionismwhen they must choose
between the demands of domestic versus foreign firms. Consequently, protection from
inward FDI will remain in any country and industry as long as domestic producers have
significant influence over domestic politics.
Finally, this research on FDI regulations reflects recent changes in the contemporary
global economy, in which countries are reevaluating trade and FDI openness. A series of
events, including the rise in security tensions between the United States andChina and the
intensifying global competition for high-tech leadership, has caused developed countries
to encourage domestic MNCs to either return home or do business with reliable partners,
such as security allies. Inevitably, the government protects domestic firms, and to a certain
extent, the protection may be necessary to prevent these firms from failing during times
of economic distress. Regardless, the rise in populism and nationalism among developed
countries in the past several years is concerning. International economic conflict slows




Protection From FDI and Economies of Scale
2.1 Introduction
One of the defining features of globalization in the twenty-first century is the prolifera-
tion of global production networks. From large auto manufacturing companies – such as
BMW,Hyundai, and Toyota – to small high-tech companies in Silicon Valley, multinational
companies have stretched their affiliates and subsidiaries worldwide. This trend is well
reflected in the study of foreign direct investment (FDI). In the period from the 1990s to
the early 2000s, much of the literature on the politics of FDI in the field of international po-
litical economy focused on how host governments competitively attract inbound FDI (Li
and Resnick, 2003; Büthe andMilner, 2008, 2009; Kerner, 2009). In addition, scholars have
also paid a great deal of attention to understanding FDI flows from the investors’ perspec-
tive and identifying which political factors are most important as the determinants of FDI
(Henisz, 2000; Jensen, 2003, 2008; Li and Vashchilko, 2010; Wright and Zhu, 2018). These
studies tend to focus on the positive effect of FDI on the economy of the host country.
However, the FDI openness of each country does not necessarily reflect the positive
views on inbound FDI. In fact, numerous countries impose restrictions on FDI inflow
through domestic policies that increase the production/operational costs of foreign firms
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(i.e., higher tax on foreign asset transactions or employment conditions). According to
the 2018 World Investment Report by UNCTAD, a significant number of countries have
adopted formal industrial development policies that are specifically designed to either
regulate or deregulate FDI in each segment of an industry. Figure 2.1 depicts the aver-
age FDI restrictiveness levels across industries of 36 members of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) and 32 non-OECD countries.1 Why dowe
see this variation across countries? More importantly, who wants more FDI regulations
and whose interests matter more to the government when shaping FDI policies? Several
studies have pointed out the preferences of voters, workers, and labor unions causing high
or low FDI restrictiveness in different industries and sectors (Malesky and Mosley, 2018;
Owen, 2013, 2015; Pandya, 2010, 2014).
Figure 2.1: Average FDI Restrictiveness Index (2017)
In this paper, I address these questions by examining the effects of FDI on domestic
industrial equilibrium. Economies of scale that are internal and external to firms play a
1 Restrictions on FDI is not only striking across countries, but across industries within each country. See the
Appendix for graphical depiction.
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critical role in shaping the preferences of domestic producers over inward FDI regulation.2
First, I argue that industrieswith internal economies of scale (IEoS) aremore likely to have
higher FDI restrictions. Under the existence of IEoS, industries tend to be structured as
oligopolies, where only a few large companies compete with each other. Hence, even one
additional firm entrant can have a highly disruptive effect on the market, which leads
to changes in political equilibrium. Moreover, foreign MNCs investing in an oligopolis-
tic industry are often direct global rivals of domestic MNCs. This implies that they are
more efficient or at least as efficient in producing high-quality goods and services. Thus,
domestic firms in IEoS industries will pressure their government to impose higher FDI
restrictions on inbound FDI in order to avoid heightened market competition.
Second, in contrast to IEoS industries, I argue that industries with external economies
of scale (EEoS) are more likely to have lower FDI restrictiveness. EEoS industries tend
to exhibit perfect or monopolistic competition, typically characterized with a large num-
ber of small- and medium-sized firms. Thus, these domestic firms are less sensitive to
supply shocks brought by foreign newcomers. In fact, domestic firms may actually sup-
port inward FDI because external economies of scale contribute to the productivity of a
firm through technology advancements and information spillovers at the industry-level.
Moreover, these spillover effects often occur with the geographic agglomeration of firms.
With more inward FDI, domestic producers can consolidate their region as a production
hub. Therefore, firms in industries with high external economies of scale are more likely
to welcome FDI to consolidate their country as a production hub.
In order to explore the effects of economies of scale on the industrial equilibrium, I de-
velop a formal model using Cournot triopoly and the political support function approach
given byGrossman andHelpman (1994). Two domestic firms and a newly entered foreign
firm compete in a Cournot fashion, thereby setting the amount of output that maximizes
2 In this paper, I use “domestic firms” and “domestic producers” interchangeably.
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their profit. Domestic producers offer political contributions to their home government for
protection. Governments trade-off producer profits against lower prices for consumers
when determining the level of restrictions on FDI. The optimal level of FDI restriction
is set endogenously, depending on the market competition and government’s weight on
consumer utility (averagewelfare). Numeric simulations indicate that the increase in each
firm’s ability to reduce costs through firm-level growth (internal economies of scale) in-
creases FDI restrictions, while an increase in each firm’s ability to reduce costs through
industry-level growth (external economies of scale) decreases FDI restrictions.
In order to test this model, I examine data on inbound FDI restrictiveness across dif-
ferent industries in OECD member countries. I find evidence that industries with high
IEoS, measured by different proxies – such as market concentration and amount of fixed
assets – are associatedwith higher FDI restrictiveness. I also find that industries with high
EEoS – measured by proxies such as geographic concentration of firms, research and de-
velopment (R&D) expenditures, and amount of intangible assets – associated with lower
FDI restrictiveness. In addition to the main dataset using the FDI restrictiveness index,
I adopted three alternative measures for FDI restrictiveness. All three measures – total
number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), World Bank ease of doing business scores,
and Shatz (2000) FDI openness scores – support my hypotheses in general. These results
suggest that economies of scale are a crucial industrial feature for understanding variation
in barriers to FDI across both industries and countries.
This paper makes three contributions to the research on politics of FDI. First, I address
the question: why do FDI regulation vary dramatically across industries? I develop a new
rigorous theory by emphasizing the importance of domestic producers and industrial fea-
tures, areas that have gained less attention from the existing international political econ-
omy scholarship. By bringing insights frombusiness and economics literature, I bridge the
gap between different disciplines on the topic of FDI andmultinationals. Second, through
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both formal and empirical models, I show that industrial structures shaped by two types
of economies of scale are crucial for understanding the variation in barriers to FDI across
both industries and countries. Finally, this paper sheds light on protectionism as a reac-
tion to globalization occurring in domains other than trade or off-shoring. By focusing on
developed countries, I point out that even in the most globalized countries, domestic pro-
ducers demand industrial protection from their governments to maintain a better position
compared to their global rivals. Therefore, protection from inward FDI will continue to
remain in industries where domestic firms have much influence over politics.
2.2 Domestic Preferences and FDI Regulations
The literature on domestic FDI policies includes restrictions on themarket entry and oper-
ations ofMNCs, aswell as FDI promotion efforts by offeringMNCs tax incentives and sub-
sidized production inputs (Pandya, 2016). Literature on FDI promotion has emphasized
how MNCs or host countries overcome the political risk of FDI. From the perspective of
MNCs, different types of entry modes can help MNCs to avoid exploitation from the host
government (Henisz, 2000; Johns andWellhausen, 2016). From the host government’s per-
spective, democratic institutions or international treaties, like bilateral investment treaties
(BITs), can function as a credible commitment for FDI protection (Jensen, 2008; Jensen
et al., 2012; Büthe and Milner, 2008; Kerner, 2009).
Extant scholarship has focused on the role that consumers and workers play in shap-
ing FDI regulation. A few studies have examined how voters’ preferences over inward FDI
are shaped by characteristics of the investment — size, number of jobs, potential environ-
mental damage, and labor commitments (Pandya, 2010, 2014;Malesky andMosley, 2018).
Moreover, the preferences of labor or the political organization of labor unions may also
shape FDI restrictions (Owen, 2013, 2015). Several studies have also examined the role of
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political parties and domestic institutions inmediating the influence of these actors (Pinto
and Pinto, 2008; Pinto, 2013; Li and Resnick, 2003). In comparison, there is comparatively
less work on the attitudes and preferences of domestic firms that face the clearest andmost
direct impacts from FDI due to market competition.
Studies in business and economics have emphasized the importance of industrial struc-
ture andmarket competition in FDI strategies developed bymultinationals (Hymer, 1976;
Knickerbocker, 1973; Chwo-Ming and Ito, 1988; Ghemawat and Thomas, 2008). Schol-
ars have also ascertained that MNCs strategically locate their foreign affiliates – either
locating closer to or further from each other – to increase profit. These studies suggest
that some firms benefit by geographic proximity, which increases information and knowl-
edge spillovers, while others benefit by distancing from otherMNCs to focus on their own
firm-specific skills and worry less about competing for available workers (Head, Ries and
Swenson, 1994; Hanson, 2001; Alcácer and Chung, 2014; Cantwell, 2009). However, these
studies focus more on the strategies of multinationals rather than how domestic multina-
tionals would react to the entry of their global rivals.
In this paper, I expand the market effect aspect of existing literature and argue that
while it may appear that domestic businesses uniformly dislike competition with foreign
MNCs, some domestic producers may actually be favorable to FDI depending on their
industry characteristics. I focus on two key economic mechanisms− internal and external
economies of scale− and domestic firms’ political interaction with the home government.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two parts: first, the paper explores the
FDI policy preferences of domestic firms, which have been relatively understudied in the
field of international political economy; and second, the paper emphasizes the differences
in this regard not only across countries but across industries within each country.
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2.3 Theoretical Framework: Economies of Scale
2.3.1 Economies of Scale and FDI Regulation
What shapes the preferences of domestic producers regarding inward FDI? In this paper,
I use Marshall’s categorization of economies of scale as the key analytical mechanism to
explain the disruptive effects of inbound FDI on domestic industrial equilibrium and how
the changes in the equilibrium influences producers’ FDI policy preferences.3 Internal
economies of scale (IEoS) occur when a firm’s cost of producing an additional unit of a
good decreases as the size of the firmgrows. For example, a largemanufacturing company
that produces automobiles would benefit from producing as many cars as possible rather
than producing a small quantity. Because IEoS occurs within an individual firm at the
industry level, the firm-specific skills that contribute to IEoS lead to an increase in compe-
tition at an industry-level. In contrast, external economies of scale (EEoS) occur outside
an individual firm but within an industry. When a firm is experiencing EEoS, it implies
that the firm can reduce the cost of producing products when the entire industry grows.
EEoS often occur with geographic agglomeration, which allows reduction in transporta-
tion costs and facilitates information exchanges. Examples of EEoS include investment
banking in New York, entertainment industry in Hollywood, and the information tech-
nology industry in the bay area. In the following subsections, I explain how the market
equilibrium of domestic industries with IEoS and EEoS are disrupted by FDI and how the
3 “The distinction between internal and external economies was introduced byMarshall (1890), and it is of-
ten referred to as theMarshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) externalities in reference to contributions ofMarshall
(2009), Arrow (1971) and Romer (1990). Much of work on external economies focuses on economies ex-
ternal to the firm but internal to the industry, [but there are also] work that considers cross-industry exter-
nalities” (Caballero and Lyons, 1990). “[External] scale economies may arise from information spillovers,
search, and matching processes in labor markets, local intra-industry specialization, and the like.” (Hen-
derson, 2003). In short, external economies of scale could be understood as positive externalities. As the
size of an industry grows, all the firms within that industry all experience increasing returns to scale in
the long-run.
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changes shape domestic firms’ FDI policy preferences.
2.3.2 Industries with Internal Economies of Scale Oppose FDI
Industries characterized by IEoS often have an oligopolistic market structure, where only
a few large firms dominate a large portion of market share. In such an environment,
even one additional supplier leads to significantly highermarket competition and reduced
prices and profits. To achieve IEoS, a firm spends a huge amount of fixed cost at the initial
stage of production, because the more it produces, the lower the cost of producing each
additional unit of goods; thus, this enables the firm to ultimately earn higher profit. Be-
cause a firm has to pay a large lump sum cost initially, there exists a high entry barrier in
industries where firms experience IEoS. This leads to only a small number of large compa-
nies dominating the market share in an IEoS industry. Thus, when a rival foreign MNC,
which can afford the high upfront cost, enters such an oligopolistic market, incumbent
firms would have to pay the cost of adjusting their business strategies. Studies also show
that an increase in production by foreignMNCs leads to a decrease in output price (in the
short run), thereby reducing domestic firms’ profitability and, thus, causing negative im-
pact on their survival (Chwo-Ming and Ito, 1988; Chari and Gupta, 2008; Görg and Strobl,
2003). Therefore, domestic firms in IEoS industries are likely to be against foreign rival
MNCs entering the market.
Second, industries with IEoS have multiple market equilibria, which makes a new en-
trance highly destabilizing. Once firms enter the IEoSmarket, they produce goods in large
quantities to achieve scale economies, which optimizes their profits. This increases the to-
tal supply of goods in the market and disrupts the market equilibrium through changes
in the price. Moreover, in many cases, these foreign competitors are more productive than
the incumbent domestic producers. MNCs tend to come from developed countries where
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technologies are highly advanced. They also have more resources, both mangerial and
production skills, and capital (Pandya, 2010). This enables foreign firms to produce high-
quality goods that are cheaper for consumers. Thus, the entrance of a foreign firm can be
incredibly destabilizing for current market allocation, because consumers will substitute a
particular product for its cheaper version. This process accelerates as domestic incumbents
may lose sales and become less efficient. Consequently, they would have to raise prices,
and lose even more customers. Thus, in order to secure their influence over the market,
domestic firms in high IEoS industries will fight hard against foreign competition.
Finally, in IEoSmarkets, firms are exceptionally concerned about preserving their firm-
specific cost-saving technologies. Thus, foreign firms work hard to limit technological
spillovers and domestic incumbents will gain little from foreign firms investing domesti-
cally. While research on FDI spillover effects have shown some evidence that FDIs from
developed economies to developing countries often bring about an increase in productiv-
ity and technology advancement, this is not applicable if the foreign firms are operating
in the same industry as the domestic rivals. In such cases, foreign MNCs would attempt
to protect the valuable technology against leakage to competitors (Marcin, 2008). This is
because the technologies of large firms contribute to scale economies that are internal to
each firm. In fact, in a firm-level study, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) find that spillover
effects are only present when domestic and foreign firms have joint venture projects and
not when foreign firms enter via greenfield investments (as wholly owned subsidiaries).
Moreover, in ascertaining whether foreign MNCs have positive or negative effects on do-
mestic firms, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that positive technology spillover only oc-
curs in smaller firms — those that have less than 50 employees. For large firms, they find
that the spillover effects disappear and the productivity of domestic firms also declines.
Therefore, I expect domestic firms in industries with high IEoS to be against foreignMNCs
entering the market.
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2.3.3 Industries with External Economies of Scale Support FDI
Industries where firms experience EEoS tend to exhibit more competitively structured
markets with numerous small- andmedium-sized firms. Thus, a few additional suppliers,
including foreign MNCs, entering local markets do not significantly disrupt the existing
industrial equilibrium. Studies on FDI behaviors have shown that firms in oligopolistic
industries are more likely to engage in FDI if their global rival companies set up plants
abroad. In contrast, firms in industries that feature a more competitively structured mar-
ket, are not affected by their competitors’ FDI behavior (Chwo-Ming and Ito, 1988; Ito
and Rose, 2002). While this study does not directly discuss the protectionist behavior of
domestic firms, it clearly shows that firms react differently depending on the industrial
features they operate in. The more competitively structured the market, the less the in-
cumbent domestic firms would react against foreign entry.
Second, domestic firms in such industries are likely towelcome foreignMNCs entering
the market because growth in the industry will consolidate their country as a production
hub. In EEoS industries, domestic firms become favorable to foreign companies entering
the market, because they expect decreases in production costs as a result of the growth
in the entire industry. Because EEoS typically occurs where firms in a certain industry
are geographically clustered together, incumbent firms will likely benefit from more suc-
cessful firms entering the market, which leads to specialization of labor, increases in the
pool of skilled labor, and more government spending on regional infrastructure. Studies
have shown that agglomeration of business is linked positively with labor productivity,
education, and urban growth (Rauch, 1993; Ciccone and Hall, 1993; Hanson, 2001). Thus,
in industries where firms experience EEoS, domestic producers will be less sensitive to
foreign MNCs entering the market.
Finally, domestic firms in EEoS industries expect productivity spillovers from foreign
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MNCs. Unlike firms in IEoS industries, where firm-specific skills are kept as secretswithin
each individual firm as secrets, firms in EEoS industries benefit from positive externali-
ties, such as information and technology spillovers, managerial skills, and greater product
specialization. The positive spillover effects also occur more frequently in EEoS industries
because M&As are active in these industries, where numerous small and medium-sized
local firms could be potential M&A targets for MNCs. MNCs with advanced skills can
readily enter another country’s market by purchasing majority shares of these domestic
targets at affordable costs (Larimo, 2003; Zejan, 1990). Studies even show that spillover ef-
fects are only present when domestic and foreign firms havemore direct interaction either
through M&As or joint venture projects, not when foreign firms enter as wholly owned
subsidiaries (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005). Therefore, domestic firms that are poten-
tial cross-border M&A targets welcome foreign FDI because they bring valuable capital as
well as information spillovers.
2.3.4 Domestic Firms’ Preferences and Government Policy Creation
It is natural for the host government to maximize the benefits generated from foreign cap-
ital inflow and respond to domestic firms’ political pressures by setting the optimal level
of FDI regulation. The host government encourages more foreign capital in the country
if it expects FDI to increase the aggregate welfare of the domestic economy. Inward FDI
enhances productivity of domestic incumbent firms through competition and technology
transfers, prevents domestic firms that lack capital from going out of business, creates job
opportunities, and helps to increasewages. This increases the grosswelfare of the country,
benefiting both consumers (through lower prices, more market competition) andworkers
(throughmore jobs). However, the effects of FDImay not always be positive, since foreign
MNCs, on average, are larger and better equipped with higher technology compared to
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average domestic competitors, thereby threatening domestic firms’ survival.4 It is possible
that domestic firms would utilize their political influence for protectionist policies.
Further, the political influence is much more prominent in IEoS industries than EEoS
industries. In IEoS industries, there are a small number of large firms, so they can bet-
ter organize for collective action. These oligopolistic industries have more political and
economic resources to influence the government for protection. The host government is
mindful of the political contributions of the special interest groups, which leads to higher
barriers to FDI. Therefore, higher FDI restrictions are more likely in IEoS industries. In
contrast, firms in EEoS industries are less organized due to lack of motivation and higher
firmheterogeneity. Since the government is not pressured by the producers in EEoS indus-
tries and FDI benefits both consumers and producers, there will be lower FDI restrictions
in these industries.
Figure 2.2 depicts actual US industries plotted based onwhether they are more IEoS or
EEoS industries. As the IEoS increase, higher FDI restrictiveness is expected, and as EEoS
increase, lower FDI restrictiveness is expected. Moreover, as evident from the figure, IEoS
and EEoS industries have contrasting features, which lead to high IEoS being correlated
with low EEoS and high EEoS being correlatedwith low IEoS. Examples of IEoS industries
include transportation and telecommunication, and examples of EEoS industries include
wholesale, retail, and hotels and restaurants. I focus on the net effect of IEoS and EEoS.
For example, even if some industries may exhibit both IEoS and EEoS characteristics, if
the the net economies of scale indicates IEoS, then that industry is an IEoS industry, even
though the degree of IEoS may be lower than other IEoS industries. Based on such an
additive feature of the effect of economies of scale, I examine whether an industry’s FDI
restrictiveness is associated with either high IEoS or high EEoS. In the following section,
4 In fact, the productivity differential between foreign and domestic firms are higher in developing than in
industrialized countries (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Harris and Robinson, 2003; Girma and Görg, 2007).
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I present a differentiated goods Cournot competition model to show the effects of IEoS
and EEoS on domestic market equilibrium and how these lead to higher or lower FDI
restrictiveness policies.
Figure 2.2: IEoS Industry vs. EEoS Industry
2.4 Formal Model
In this section, I introduce the Cournot triopoly with differentiated products to formally
show how industry characteristics – internal and external economies of scale – affect do-
mestic firms’ reaction to the FDI regulation policy. For firms that compete in the IEoS
industry, I add a term (θ) in the cost function to reflect a decrease in marginal costs as the
size of each firm’s output increases. For firms competing under an EEoS industry, I change
the cost function by adding a term (η) that decreases the marginal cost as the size of all
three firms’ output increase. After solving for the equilibrium profits for each model, I
employ the political support approach to identify the optimal level of FDI regulation set
by the host government (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Hillman, 1982). Comparative
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statics show that FDI restrictions increase with the degree of IEoS and decrease with the
degree of EEoS.
2.4.1 Differentiated Cournot Triopoly Under IEoS
The market considered in this paper consists of three competing firms that interact with
one another in Cournot fashion. There are two identical domestic firms (d1, d2) and one
foreign firm (f) in a certain industry. While all firms have the same marginal cost of pro-
duction (c), the foreign firm’smarginal cost of production is increased by the host (domes-
tic) government’s FDI regulation policy (τ > 1). Each firm produces differentiated goods,
which is reflected in the following quadratic market utility function5 of a representative
consumer:










γ(qd1qd2 + qd1qf + qd2qf ), (2.1)









= α− βqi − γΣj 6=iqj (2.3)
5 To reflect product differentiation, I use a quadratic utility (linear demand) function instead of a more pop-
ularly used constant elasticity of substitution or Cobb-Douglas function to reach an explicit equilibrium.
For the linear demand function that incorporates product differentiation, see Ledvina and Sircar (2011).
6 In this paper, I assume β > γ > 0, which implies that i and j are differentiated goods. Other cases include
i and j as: independent goods γ = 0, homogeneous goods (γ = β), complementary goods (γ < 0), and
substitute goods (γ > 0).
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Then, the profit function for domestic firms d1 and d2 are:







Here, c is the marginal cost and θ is the degree of IEoS that influences c. If θ > 0, there
exist IEoS in this industry, and if θ < 0, there are internal diseconomies of scale. 1
2
is added
before θ to simplify calculations. The profit function for the foreign firm (equation (5)) is
similar to that of the domestic firms, but the marginal cost is increased by τ , which is the
FDI regulations imposed by the government.7







Finding out the equilibrium output and profit for each firm is rather simple, but due to
mathematical complexity, I solve the Cournot triopoly numerically (in Appendix 5.2).
2.4.2 Differentiated Cournot Triopoly Under EEoS
In this section, I add another term η that represents the degree of EEoS in the cost function
and see how it changes the FDI regulation term, τ . The model set up is exactly the same as
that in the IEoS industry, where two domestic firms and one foreign firm compete in the
market by setting the optimal output. The following expressions are the profit functions
for domestic and foreign firms under an EEoS industry:



















7 FDI regulations include all types of policies − such as direct taxation on foreign assets, foreign equity
limitations, ownership restrictions, or governmental approval process − that could increase the costs of
producing goods when operating in a foreign country.
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In the marginal cost functions, c− 1
2
θqd1 − η(qd1 + qf ) and τc− 12θqf − η(qd1 + qd2), the
degree of EEoS, η, is dependent on the output of the industry − which is represented by
another domestic firm and a foreign firm. Thus, marginal cost c is reduced by the amount
of η proportion of the industry output. When η > 0, the industry is experiencing EEoS,
whereas if η < 0, the industry is experiencing external diseconomies of scale. Note that
η term in the marginal cost function does not include the firm’s own output because the
effect of its own growth in output is already reflected in the θ term. I solve the model
numerically due to mathematical complexity (see Appendix 5.2).
2.4.3 Optimal FDI Regulation
The host government sets the FDI regulation policy by maximizing the social welfare of
domestic actors.8 I assume that the host government includes only the profits of domestic
firms in their objective functions.9 There are two reasons for this assumption. First, domes-
tic firms havemoremeans to influence domestic politicians and have plenty of information
on how domestic politics work as compared to foreign firms. Second, politicians are more
likely to support ‘national champion’ firms to promote national prestige or reputation in
the global stage. Therefore, I set the host government’s objective function, G, to be a com-
bination of the representative consumer’s utility and domestic firms’ profits. 0 < w < 1 is
8 I use political support function approach developed in Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Hillman
(1982).
9 Assuming that governments also include the profits of foreign firms in their objective functionmightmake
an interesting extension, which I leave to future work.
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the weight that government attaches to the gross welfare of domestic economy (consumer
utility) relative to the political influence of domestic firms.
G = wU∗ + (1− w)(π∗d1 + π∗d2) (2.8)
In this manner, the host government cares about the foreign producer’s welfare indirectly
through domestic consumer’s utility, and domestic producers directly influence the gov-
ernment based on their profit. The higher the profit, the stronger their political influence
on FDI policies. To set the optimal FDI regulation policy, the host government maximizes
its objective function in terms of τ :
τ ∗ = argmax
τ
G (2.9)
In the following section, I use numerical simulations to solve for optimal FDI restric-
tions τ ∗ and comparative statics.
2.4.4 Numerical Simulations and Comparative Statics
To examine the comparative statics results of the models, I ran four sets of numerical sim-
ulations by assigning a range of numbers to each parameter (α, β, γ, c, w, θ, and η). I use
computational results – instead of analytic – to show the robustness of my theory under
different sets of parameters. In addition to robustness check, numerical simulations show
how changes in the range of w cause changes in the effects of θ and η on τ . In both IEoS
and EEoS simulations, comparative statics show expected results only when the host gov-
ernment gives more importance to the interests of domestic producers (in other words,
w < 0.5).
Across 92% of the grid points in the IEoS model simulation (S = 312, 500), I find that
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changes in θ is associated with positive change in τ (δτ ∗/δθ), when 0.1 ≤ w ≤ 0.5. How-
ever, when 0.5 ≤ w ≤ 0.9, the positive relationship between θ and τ decreases to 30.4%.
Table 2.1 presents the range of each parameter value for the numerical simulation of IEoS
in a Cournot triopoly. Thus, the numerical simulations suggest that a host government
favorable to special interest groups is more likely to impose higher FDI restrictions when
domestic firms experience a higher degree of internal economies of scale. In contrast,
when the host government cares more about consumers utility, there are more cases of
negative association between θ and τ (69.6%) than cases of positive association. When
parameters for the inverse demand function are each set to a single value (α = 1, β = 0.5,
and γ = 0.2), δτ ∗/δθ is always greater than 0 (across 100% of the grid points, S = 10, 000),
when w < 0.5. Thus, when the host government favors domestic producers over con-
sumers (w < 0.5), greater internal economies of scale among firms in an industry (θ) will
lead to higher equilibrium barriers to foreign investment (τ).
Table 2.1: Numerical Simulations for the IEoS Model




α [1, 1.5] 5
δτ ∗/δθ > 0: 92%,
when w < 0.5
β [0.5, 1] 5
γ [0.1, 0.4] 5
c [0.5 1] 5
w [0.1, 0.5] and [0.5, 0.9] 5




δτ ∗/δθ > 0: 100%,
when w < 0.5
β 0.5 1
γ 0.2 1
c [0.5 1] 10
w [0.1, 0.5] and [0.5, 0.9] 10
θ [0.1, 3] 100
In the numerical simulations for the EEoSmodel, I find that across 97.5% of grid points
(S = 72, 900) the relationship between external economies of scale (EEoS, η) and FDI
regulations(τ) is negative when w < 0.5. However, when w > 0.5, an increase in η de-
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creases τ only half of the time (50%). Table 2.2 presents the ranges of parameter values that
were run in the simulation. η is set to be higher than 0.5 so that the effect is not shadowed
by θ, which is less than or equal to 0.5. When parameters for the inverse demand curve are
fixed to a certain value (α = 1, β = 0.5, and γ = 0.2), change in η is always associated with
negative change in τ (across 100% of the grid points, S = 100, 000). Therefore, restrictive-
ness of FDI regulations decrease as domestic firms experience more external economies
of scale within an industry. The simulations demonstrate that when the host government
favors domestic producers over consumers (w < 0.5), greater external economies of scale
among firms in an industry (η) will lead to lower equilibrium barriers to foreign invest-
ment (τ).
Table 2.2: Numerical Simulation Settings for the EEoS Model




α [1, 1.5] 3
δτ ∗/δη < 0: 97.5%,
when w < 0.5
β [0.5, 1] 3
γ [0.1, 0.4] 3
c [0.5 1] 3
w [0.1, 0.5] 3
θ [0, 0.5] 3




δτ ∗/δη < 0: 100%,
when w < 0.5
β 0.5 1
γ 0.2 1
c [0.5 1] 10
w [0.1, 0.5] 10
θ [0, 0.5] 10
η [0.5, 3] 100
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2.5 Empirical Analysis
2.5.1 Arguments and Hypotheses
First, industries with high internal economies of scale tend to have high market concen-
tration, or an oligopolistic structure. The domestic producers of IEoS industries will be
wary of inward FDI because the disruption in the market equilibrium has negative con-
sequences. An additional foreign competitor in the market will increase the supply of
goods and services, which leads to a decrease in the prices. Moreover, in IEoS industries,
foreign MNCs are at least as efficient and productive as domestic MNCs. Thus, incum-
bent domestic producers will be against foreignMNCs entering their market and pressure
their government for more restrictive inward FDI policies. Therefore, industries with high
economies of scale will have higher FDI restrictiveness.
Hypothesis 1: Industries with greater internal economies of scale among
firms are likely to have more restrictions on inbound FDI.
Second, industries with high external economies of scale typically exhibit features that
are closer to perfect competition, where the entry of newcomers does not have as much
of a negative affect as it does in IEoS industries. Firms in EEoS tend to concentrate ge-
ographically in order to benefit from information exchanges, technology spillovers, and
specialization. Thus, incumbent firms may actually benefit from foreign MNCs entering
the market. Therefore, industries with high external economies of scale will have lower
FDI restrictiveness.
Hypothesis 2: Industries with greater external economies of scale among
firms are likely to have less restrictions on inbound FDI.
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2.5.2 Data and Measurements
Dependent Variable: OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index
To test the hypotheses above, I created a dataset of 30 industries for each 36 OECD
member countries. The dependent variable, FDI restrictiveness index (hereafter, FDI in-
dex), measures the inward FDI restrictiveness of 43 industries/sectors of the 59 OECD and
non-OECD countries in 1997, 2003, 2006, and from 2010 to 2018. The 43 categories include
the sub-categories of industries, and after excluding the higher categories, there are 30 sep-
arate industries in the data. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 being 100% restrictive.
The FDI index is based on the “OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements” and
the “OECD National Treatment Instrument.” Each country has explicitly lodged reser-
vations for different types of FDI on various industries.10 Figure 2.3 below depicts the
average FDI Restrictiveness Index of OECD countries by industry. As evident from the
figure, even within relatively advanced economies (OECD), FDI regulations exist across
all industries.
Independent Variables: Proxies for IEoS and EEoS
I employ several different proxy measures to determine the extent to which industries
are characterized by internal or external economies of scale. I first use data collected from
the U.S. Census Bureau to examine the relationship between two different industry char-
acteristics and FDI restrictiveness. Here, I treat industries as if they exhibit similar features
across countries. Using U.S. industry-level data, I test my hypothesis on 36 OECD coun-
tries. In the second dataset, I use industry-level data of Structural and Demographic Busi-
10The reservations present which industries countries would like to be exempt from liberalization of capital.
For example, in the final section of the Code, Australia lodged reservation on a foreign entity’s real estate
purchase. In other words, Australia reserves its right to impose restrictions on real estate purchase from
a foreign entity. OECD data on the FDI Restrictiveness Index takes these reservations into account, when
measuring FDI restrictiveness.
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Figure 2.3: OECD Average FDI Restrictiveness Index by Industry (2017)
ness Statistics (SDBS) from the OECD statistics database. Finally, I also collect firm-level
accounting data from the Orbis database.
U.S. Census Bureau Data
In the first dataset, I utilize data on the the market concentration and the number of
enterprise from the U.S. Census Bureau database as a baseline model to test my hypothe-
ses. 11 I use the U.S. industry data because the data includes a detailed categorization of
industries (21 in total), which matches well with the industry categorization of the de-
pendent variable (FDI restrictiveness index). Currently, the available years for market
concentration and number of enterprises are 2002, 2007, and 2012. Since the FDI restric-
tiveness index years begin from 2010, I utilize data for only 2012.12 Market concentration –
measured by the market share of the top 4, 8, 20, and 50 companies – is used as a proxy for
internal economies of scale. Further, I utilize the market share of the the top 20 companies
because it is closest to the average of all four measures.
11American FactFinder, U.S. Census Bureau (accessed 04.17.2019.)
12While FDI restrictiveness index does include data for 1997, 2003, and 2006, OECD has changed its method
ofmeasuring the restrictiveness since 2010. Thus, for consistency, I only utilize the years from2010 onward.
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For external economies of scale, I measure industry geographic concentration as a
proxy for external economies of scale. This is an appropriate proxy because EEoS often oc-
curs when firms have information and technological spillover effects, which is most likely
to happen when firms are located close to each other geographically. Just like industry
concentration data, the OECD data to measure EEoS contains a lot of missing values and
broad industry categories; thus, I utilize U.S. data to test the hypotheses. For the U.S.
baseline data, I use the data on the number of enterprise establishments by major regions
within the U.S. that is collected from the same database as that for the U.S. industry con-
centration. To calculate the geographic concentration by industry, I take the ratio of the
maximum number of enterprise establishments in a region to the entire number of enter-
prise establishments in the U.S. Similar to the market concentration data in the U.S., there
are 21 industries in this dataset.
Geographic Concentration = Highest number of firms among all regionsEntire number of firms in the U.S.
OECD SDBS Data
In the second dataset, I utilize industry-level enterprise birth rate and R&D expenses
data from the OECD statistics database. Despite disagreements regarding how to define
barriers to entry(Demsetz, 1982), most economists agree that these barriers are often some
sort of fixed entry cost.13 Hennart and Park (1993) and Slangen and Hennart (2007) sug-
gest that firms, unless they expect high profit in the long-run through economies of scale,
will not enter foreign markets via greenfield investment. Thus, while it is controversial
to say that barriers to entry are equivalent to economies of scale, it is safe to assume that
firms would want to set long-run prices above long-run average cost in order to compen-
13 In Demsetz (1982), economists like Joe Bain and James Ferguson correlates barriers to entry with
economies of scale and monopoly return. In contrast, George Stigler argues that as long as firms can
afford the upfront cost, “barriers” do not have to constitute economies of scales.
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sate for the high fixed costed paid during market entrance (Pandya, 2014). If this is the
case, there must be low amounts of new entry in industries with high IEoS. Thus, I use
industry-level enterprise birth rate (EBR) data as a proxy for IEoS. If an industry has high
EBR but simultaneously equally high or even higher enterprise death rate (EDR), newly
entering firms can expect profit in the long-run since the total number of competitors ei-
ther remains the same or decreases. However, if an industry has high EBR but low EDR,
then the number of competitors are continuously increasing, thereby making monopolis-
tic behavior difficult. Therefore, I subtract EDR from EBR because the focus of this paper
is more on the competition between firms within an industry.
For EEoS, I utilize the total amount of R&D expenses in each industry as the proxy.
As explained in the theory section of this paper, EEoS industries typically have substan-
tial information and technology spillovers across individual firms, which makes domestic
producers more favorable to inward FDI. Industries with external economies of scale are
more likely to influence each other on account of being geographically close to one an-
other. This agglomeration is more often witnessed in industries that are highly dependent
on R&D investment (Feldman, 1999; Branstetter, 2006). Thus, the more R&D intense an
industry is, the more likely it is EEoS industry.
Orbis Firm Data
In the third dataset, I use firm-level data of fixed assets and R&D expenses collected
from the Orbis database. I only included companies whose stocks are publicly listed be-
cause the financial information of these companies is typically more reliable than that
of companies that are unlisted. Once I sorted out the publicly listed companies of all 36
OECD countries, I obtained a total of 18,309 companies. Further, I collected information on
the relevant accounting details including fixed assets, total assets, and research and devel-
opment (R&D) expense as a share of operating revenue. I downloaded this information
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from the years 2010 to 2017 to match with the FDI restrictiveness index variable. Then,
I sorted the companies according to the industry categorization of the FDI index, which
yielded a total of 21 industries. Finally, I take the average values of all the companies by
each industry. While some highly advanced economies such as the U.S. and most of the
Western European countries have data for all 21 industries, some others such as Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have only 15-20 industries available.
For IEoS proxy, I use fixed assets as a share of total assets. By definition, fixed assets
refer to a long-term tangible property or equipment that is required for a firm’s produc-
tion. Examples of fixed assets include buildings, machinery, computer equipment, land,
furniture, and vehicles. According to Wright and Zhu (2018), “large capital requirements
and substantial economies of scale in sunk costs associated with fixed asset investments
constitute barriers for potential entrants, resulting in market concentration.” Therefore, I
use the average percentage of fixed assets as a share of average total assets (of all compa-
nies within an industry) as a proxy for IEoS. In addition, I utilize R&D expenses as a share
of operating revenue as a proxy for EEoS.14 I also utilize total amount of intangible assets,
such as intellectual property or brand name, as the second EEoS proxy in the Orbis data.
Control Variables
I include several control variables at the country level, which could be sources of alter-
native explanation for FDI restrictiveness. I include four control variables: GDPPC (log),
GDP Growth (%), Population (% of age 15-64), Import as % share of GDP, Outward FDI
as % share of GDP, and Security Industries. GDP per capita reflects the level of economic
advancement of different countries. Countries with higher GDP per capita are less likely
to impose high FDI restrictions. GDP growth rate is included to control for the country-
14Operating revenue is different from total revenue in that the income is strictly obtained from the busi-
ness activities conducted by the producer. For example, a law firm’s income generated by its lawyers’
legal services is an operating revenue, but gifts from one of the clients are considered as a non-operating
revenue.
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level economic shock to each industry. Next, I also include logged population in order to
reflect both the market size and the pool of possible workforce. Countries with a larger
population would be more open towards inward FDI due to higher demand for foreign
goods and job creation. Third, I include import as a percentage of GDP, because countries
that import intermediate goods from abroad are more likely to be open to FDI due to the
integration of the global supply chain. I also include inward FDI as a percentage of GDP
to control the extent to which a country is reliant on FDI. All the variables are downloaded
from the World Development Indicators by the World Bank database. Finally, I include a
dummy variable (Security) for three industries that are sensitive due to concerns around
national security. These are mining and quarrying, electricity, and transportation (air and
maritime).
Empirical Model
For all the regressions, I employ linear mixed-effects (multilevel) model for the em-
pirical analysis to account for group-level (country-level) variations. The model can be
specified in the following manner:
yijt = αj + βXijt + ηUjt + γWijt + δZi + εijt (2.10)
Equation (10) is the regression model for the empirical analysis in this paper. i =
1, ..., n represents each industry within a country, j = 1, ..., J represents 36 OECD coun-
tries, and t represents time period from 2010 to 2017. The random intercept α varies by
country-level. β is the fixed effects coefficient for either IEoS or EEoS (Xit), which are unit-
(industry), group- (country), and time-varying. Industry and time are considered fixed
in themodel. η is the coefficient for country-level economic predictors, U (GDP per capita,
GDP growth, and population aged between 15 and 64 years as a share of total population).
γ is the coefficient for all industry, country, and time-varying predictors (import as share of
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GDP and outward FDI a as share of GDP) that accounts for howmuch an industry within
a country is integrated to the global economy. Finally, δ is the industry-varying coefficient
for security-sensitive industries, which includes oil and mining, electricity, telecommuni-
cation, and transportation. Z = 1 if it is a security-sensitive industry.
2.5.3 Results and Findings
In Table 2.3, I present the regression results of three different proxies for IEoS and the
FDI restrictiveness index (FDI index), which includes relevant control variables. All four
models indicate that industry concentration leads to higher FDI restrictiveness. The first
model, column (1), presents the industry concentration of the top 20 firms in the U.S.
applied to 36 OECD countries. The coefficient on industry concentration is positive and
statistically significant, thereby suggesting that the highermarket share of large companies
has a positive effect on FDI regulation. In the second column, I present a model using net
enterprise birth rates (EBR) as an IEoS proxy. Since IEoS involves high barriers to entry,
net EBR and FDI index should have a negative correlation. The result indeed indicates a
negative coefficient, where a unit increase in birthrate leads to a decrease of 0.2% in the
FDI index. Model (3) indicates the regression result of the third proxy for IEoS, which is
the average percentage of fixed assets in total assets. This variable is also positively and
significantly associated with the FDI index, thereby indicating that industries with firms
that spendmuch on fixed assets – such as land, buildings, and equipment – aremore likely
to have higher FDI restrictions. Thus, the results in Table 2.3 support my first hypothesis
that industries with higher internal economies of scale are more likely to be associated
with higher FDI restrictiveness.
Further, the models in Table 2.3 also include a few crucial economic control variables
as well as a dummy variable for security-sensitive industries. GDPPC (log), GDP growth,
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percentage of population aged between 15 and 64 years, and outward FDI (as a share of
GDP) do not show any statistical significance, except for GDP growth in the first model
where it is positively associated with FDI restrictiveness index. The positive correlation
between growth rate and FDI restrictions is because countries with high growth rates tend
to be less economically advanced and they are more likely to have higher FDI restrictions.
Imports as a share of GDP consistently shows positive and significant association with
the FDI restrictiveness index. A possible explanation for this finding is that MNCs are
more likely to establish their foreign subsidiaries in countries where they export (from
host countries’ view, import) the most. Finally, coefficients for security-sensitive indus-
tries − electricity distribution, electricity generation, air and maritime transportation −
are positive and statistically significant in all models, thereby indicating that the host gov-
ernment’s security reviews on certain industries is well reflected in the FDI index data.15
While regression results for IEoS proxies are consistent, the coefficient for EEoS proxy –
R&D expenses – in model (4) does not have statistical significance, although it shows neg-
ative association. Table 2.4 presents more detailed results for EEoS proxies.
In Table 2.4, I present the linearmixed effects results for the analysis of EEoS.Model (1)
shows the first EEoS proxy, which is the U.S. firms’ geographic concentration by industry.
While the coefficient indicates a negative correlation with the FDI index, it does not have
statistical significance. Model (2) presents the effect of the logged total amount of R&D ex-
pense in an industry on FDI restriction. As expected, industries with high R&D expenses
are more likely to have lower FDI regulation. The third proxy for EEoS, which is also the
amount of R&D expense but is measured as a share of operating revenue, reveals a nega-
tive and statistically significant correlationwith the FDI restrictiveness index. This implies
that industries with R&D intense firms are more likely to have lower FDI restrictiveness.
Finally, model (4) indicates that firms with high intangible assets – which includes intel-
15A good example of this would be the Committee on Foreign Investments in the U.S.
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Table 2.3: The Effect of IEoS on FDI Restrictiveness Index
Dependent variable: The FDI Restrictiveness Index
US Data OECD Data Orbis Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Industry Concentration 0.108∗∗∗
(0.041)
Net Enterprise Birth Rate −0.002∗
(0.001)
Fixed Assets 0.114∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(% of Total Assets) (0.013) (0.013)
R&D Expense −0.001
(% of Operating Revenue) (0.001)
GDPPC (log) 0.023 0.013 −0.00003 0.001
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
GDP Growth 0.008∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Population 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.001
(aged between 15 and 64) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Imports −0.001∗ −0.001∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(% of GDP) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Outward FDI −0.002 −0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
(% of GDP) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Security-sensitive 0.104∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant −0.463 −0.354 −0.070 −0.044
(0.363) (0.267) (0.246) (0.243)
Observations 756 2,567 4,428 4,285
Log Likelihood 289.139 1,552.029 2,001.199 2,101.646
Akaike Inf. Crit. −554.278 −3,084.059 −3,982.399 −4,181.293
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −498.742 −3,025.554 −3,918.442 −4,111.301
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.4: The Effect of EEoS on FDI Restrictiveness Index
Dependent variable: The FDI Restrictiveness Index
U.S. data OECD data Orbis data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Geographic Concentration −0.025
(0.114)
R&D Expense (log) −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
R&D Expense −0.002∗∗
(% of Operating Revenue) (0.001)
Intangible Assets (log) −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Fixed Assets 0.118∗∗∗
(% of Total Assets) (0.013)
GDPPC (log) 0.028 0.010 0.006 0.007 0.003
(0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
GDP Growth 0.011∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Population 0.007 0.0004 0.001 0.002 0.002
(aged between 15 and 64) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Imports −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(% of GDP) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Outward FDI −0.002 −0.0002 −0.00004 0.00003 0.0001
(% of GDP) (0.002) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Security-sensitive 0.168∗∗∗ 0.004 0.108∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant −0.627 −0.027 −0.058 −0.078 −0.075
(0.426) (0.201) (0.243) (0.246) (0.246)
Observations 756 3,066 4,459 4,590 4,413
Log Likelihood 265.259 2,487.359 2,146.299 2,027.724 1,985.970
Akaike Inf. Crit. −510.518 −4,954.717 −4,272.598 −4,035.448 −3,949.941
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −464.238 −4,894.436 −4,208.571 −3,971.132 −3,879.625
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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lectual property rights, copyrights, and human capital – are more likely to be associated
with a lower FDI index. This result is consistent when I include an IEoS proxy (% of fixed
asset in total asset). Therefore, the regression results in Table 2.4 strongly support my
second hypotheses that EEoS industries are associated with lower FDI restrictiveness.
The control variables in models (1) through (5) in Table 2.3 indicate very similar re-
sults to that of Table 2.4. Countries that are more dependent on imports are more likely
to have lower FDI restrictions, and security-sensitive industries – mining and quarrying,
electricity, and air and water transportation – continue to show positively and statistically
significant correlations with the FDI restrictiveness index, with the exception of model
(2). The tendency of imposing high restrictions on certain industries are, in fact, explicitly
expressed in ‘Annex B’ of the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements.16
2.6 Other Indicators of FDI Openness/Regulation
In this section, I test the effect of IEoS and EEoS on FDI regulations by using three different
measures of FDI openness− total number of bilateral investment treaties,World BankEase
of Doing Business Scores, and Shatz (2000) FDI openness scores. While these measures
are great indicators for FDI openness at a country-level, they do not provide information
at an industry-level. Thus, for the independent variables, I aggregate the industry-level
numbers into country-level variables by taking the average across industries within each
country. Moreover, I selected the independent variables that showed the strongest statis-
tical support for the hypotheses. For IEoS, I used industry concentration, share of fixed
assets (as % of total assets), and share of tangible assets (as % of total assets). For EEoS, I
16For more information, visit the following link: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/
Code-capital-movements-EN.pdf. Annex B (pp. 43-118) includes reservations lodged by individual
OECD member states to the Code. While most languages are very vague, a few countries explicitly indi-
cate industries or sectors that are considered sensitive to their national security and public order.
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used R&D expenses, share of intangible assets (as % of total assets), and total amount of
intangible assets (logged).
Number of Bilateral Investment Treaties
The first alternative indicator I used is the total number of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) in each country. For years 2010 to 2017, I summed all the BITs that were “in force”
in 36 OECDmember states. BITs are commonly signed between a developed and a devel-
oping country in an attempt to increase the FDI flows to the developing country, thereby
signaling credible commitment to protect foreignMNCs (Kerner, 2009; Büthe andMilner,
2008; Busse, Königer andNunnenkamp, 2010; Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, 2011). Thus, the
number of BITs signed serves as another indicator for FDI openness in developing coun-
tries. However, BITs can also serve as a good indicator for FDI openness in high-income
(developed) countries, because they reaffirm or create new legal rights and provide ad-
ditional avenues for resolving disputes with host countries regarding tax, regulation, and
other indirect forms of harm to foreign corporations. They also guarantee national treat-
ment, which prevents discrimination against foreign affiliates. Therefore, the total number
of BITs works nicely as an indicator for FDI openness in OECD countries.
Table 2.5 presents the results of IEoS and the number of BITs in force. While only half
of the proxies support my hypotheses, the negative and positive signs of the coefficients
provide expected results. Models (2) and (3) of Table 2.5 support my first hypothesis
that industries where firms experience higher IEoS would have higher FDI regulations.
Since the number of BITs indicate openness for FDI, it makes sense that the share of fixed
assets and tangible assets are negatively associated with the numbers of BITs. Thus, ac-
cording to models (2) and (3), countries with industries that are more characterized by
IEoS in general tend to have lower FDI openness. Moreover, model (6) also supports
my second hypothesis that industries where firms experience higher external economies
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of scales would have lower FDI regulations. The amount of intangible assets associated
with higher numbers of BITs reflect my argument on EEoS and FDI regulations. In other
words, countries with industries that are, in general, more characterized by EEoS tend to
have higher FDI openness.
Table 2.5: Economies of Scale and BITs
Dependent variable:
The Total Number of BITs In Force




(% of Total Assets) (27.34)
Tangible Assets −85.17∗∗∗




(% of Total Assets) (24.43)
Intangible Assets 3.87∗∗∗
(log) (0.76)
Observations 94 282 282 282 282 282
R2 0.004 0.013 0.071 0.002 0.001 0.088
Adjusted R2 −0.029 −0.016 0.044 −0.027 −0.028 0.061
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
World Bank ‘Ease of Doing Business’ Scores
The World Bank’s scores on Ease of Doing Business is another great indicator for FDI
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openness/regulations.17 Ease of Doing Business score calculates the regulatory environ-
ment of a country based on the evaluation of several criteria: starting a business, deal-
ing with construction permits, registering property, protecting minority investors, paying
taxes, trading across borders, etc. The score is reflected on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is
the lowest and 100 is the highest regulatory performance. While the Ease of Doing Business
score covers all local entrepreneurs, including both domestic and foreign firms, it repre-
sents the level of institutional attractiveness, which is the most important determinant for
inbound FDI. Therefore, I expect the Ease of Doing Business score will closely resemble the
FDI-friendly/regulatory environment.
Table 2.6 presents the relationship between two types of economies of scales and the
ease of doing business scores. While models (1) and (2) do not indicate statistical sig-
nificance, the negative signs of the coefficients do reflect my first hypothesis that IEoS
industries are more likely to have higher FDI restrictiveness (or a less business-friendly
environment). Model (3) strongly supports my argument on IEoS and FDI restrictive-
ness. Countries with industries that are, in general, more characterized by IEoS (higher
share of tangible assets) are less likely to have a business-friendly environment (higher
FDI restrictiveness). Models (4), (5), and (6) all strongly support my second hypothesis
on EEoS and FDI regulations. According to the models (4)–(6), countries with industries
that are, in general, more characterized by EEoS (total R&D expenses, share of intangible
assets, and total amount of intangible assets) are more likely to be associated with a more
business friendly environment (lower FDI restrictiveness).
Shatz’s (2000) FDI Openness Scores
The third FDI regulation indicator I usedwas obtained fromShatz (2000).18 The author
17For more information, visit https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/doing-business-score
18See Shatz, H. J. (2000). The location of united states multinational affiliates (Order No. 9972497).
Available from ABI/INFORM Collection; ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. (304599730).
Retrieved from https://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/
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Table 2.6: Economies of Scale and Ease of Doing Business
Dependent variable:
WB: Ease of Doing Business Scores




(% of Total Assets) (5.64)
Tangible Assets −13.75∗∗∗




(% of Total Assets) (4.61)
Intangible Assets 0.52∗∗∗
(log) (0.16)
Observations 97 284 284 284 284 284
R2 0.001 0.00001 0.044 0.268 0.139 0.036
Adjusted R2 −0.031 −0.029 0.016 0.247 0.114 0.008
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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developed an annual rating of the FDI openness of 56 countries (excluding Netherlands
Antilles) from 1986 to 1995. Shatz particularly examined the following three administra-
tive components that are relevant to inward FDI: “first rates a country on the simplicity of
its approval process; second rates a country on the ability of foreigners to acquire domesti-
cally owned firms; and the final component rates a country on the freedom to remit profits
and repatriate capital.”19 While the years do not match with the independent variables,
Shatz’s FDI openness score still works as an alternative measure for FDI restrictiveness, as
it assumes that each country’s FDI regulatory environment does not change dramatically
over time. Since the years do not match, I use the average across years. In addition, 10
countries were excluded because the scores did not exist in Shatz (2000).20
Table 2.7 presents the regression results of the effect of two economies of scales on
Shatz’s FDI openness scores. Models (3) and (5) provide support for my two hypotheses,
while others are statistically insignificant. In model (3), the share of tangible assets, a
proxy for internal economies of scale, shows a negative association with the FDI openness
score. This implies that countries that tend to have industries with high IEoS have higher
FDI restrictiveness. When examining model (5), the proportion of of intangible assets
indicate a positive relationship with the FDI openness score, which implies that countries
that are more characterized by industries with high EEoS are more likely to have lower
FDI restrictiveness. However, due to a lack of sufficient observations, the overall results
are not as strong as the regression results from the scores of the number of BITs and Ease
of Doing Business scores.
304599730?accountid=14667
19Shatz (2000), p.172.
20These countries are: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia,
Slovakia, and the United States.
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Table 2.7: Economies of Scale and FDI Openness
Dependent variable:
Shatz (2000) FDI Openness Score




(% of Total Assets) (2.87)
Tangible Assets −5.81∗∗




(% of Total Assets) (2.05)
Intangible Assets 0.10
(0.11)
Observations 24 26 26 26 26 26
R2 0.012 0.022 0.221 0.026 0.184 0.035
Adjusted R2 −0.033 −0.018 0.189 −0.015 0.150 −0.005
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper explores a relatively understudied aspect of the literature on the politics of
FDI. While existing studies have made much progressed on numerous topics – such as
the determinants of inbound FDI, FDI preferences based on distributive consequences, as
well as the strategic actions of foreign multinational corporations – the importance of in-
dustrial structure on FDI regulation has been rather neglected in the field of international
political economy. Industrial features, however, are crucial in shaping attitudes towards
restrictions on inbound FDI by domestic producers. In this paper, I provide a rigorous
new theoretical framework using two distinct types of economies of scale. IEoS industries
typically exhibit an oligopolistic market where only a few number of large companies co-
exist. When facing a disruption in the market equilibrium that will is likely to cause a
negative affect on their profits, these domestic firms demand the government to institute
a more restrictive inward FDI policy. In contrast, in industries where firms experience
external economies of scale, the demand for restrictive inward FDI policy diminishes ei-
ther because these markets resemble perfect competition and thus, the additional entry
of competitors does not make much difference to the market equilibrium or because the
disruption in the equilibrium brings higher profit.
Through formal and empirical analysis, I found support for my theory emphasizing
the importance of economies of scale. Under the differentiated Cournot triopoly, the ex-
tent of IEoS leads to an increase in the FDI regulations while the extent of EEoS leads to a
decrease in the FDI regulations imposed by the host government that favors the interests
of domestic producers over consumer utility. In the empirical analysis, I showed that in-
dustries with IEoS – measured by industry concentration, lower number of new entrants
entrance of new enterprises, and high fixed assets as a share of total assets – lead to higher
FDI restrictiveness. Moreover, industries with EEoS – measured by industry geographic
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concentration of firms, R&D expenses as a share of operating revenues, and total amount
of intangible assets – are associated with lower FDI restrictiveness. Therefore, industry
characteristics and how the market equilibrium is affected by inward FDI are crucial el-
ements in understanding the variation in FDI restrictiveness across both industries and
countries.
The research on FDI regulation directly reflects contemporary international economic
relations: a wave of resurgent nationalism and newly aggressive industrial policies in de-
veloped countries. While inward FDI regulations have been subtle in developed coun-
tries, the recent series of events in the advanced economies – such as Brexit, the US-China
trade war, and the COVID-19 crisis – countries are beginning to adopt apparent barriers
against FDI. In addition, as observed from the case of Huawei’s 5G network, countries are
demanding that foreign firms must divest when national security concerns are at hand.
Such discrimination against foreign firms are likely to rise in the near future, particularly in
the information, communication, and technology (ICT) sector, which is closely related to
sensitive and strategic technology. However, industrial feature that is crucial to the deter-
minant of FDI has been understudied in the field of international political economy. Thus,
my research can offer explanation to the causes of FDI protectionism across industries and
countries.
That said, the study on FDI regulation and industrial features needs to be further re-
fined by examining FDI by different entry mode strategies, inter-industry activities, and
types of countries. How are greenfield investments and cross-borderM&As regulated dif-
ferently by developed countries? Would inter-industry activities matter in whether one
industry supports FDI in another industry? Finally, while I focused on developed coun-
tries in this paper, would the same FDI regulation patterns be evident across industries in
developing countries? Future research should address how FDI regulations are affected





FDI Entry Modes and the Demand for
Regulations on Inward FDI
3.1 Introduction
As the effects of the pandemic severely curbed global economic activity, foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) in 2020 fell to one of the lowest levels in recent decades.1 The sharp fall in
FDI activity came amidst an already declining trend in FDI since 2015, when FDI reached
its peak (a total of 2 trillion USD). Several factors, particularly the uncertainty regarding
the global economy due to Brexit and the US-China trade war, have contributed to the de-
crease in FDI. In addition, a recent move to stricter FDI regulations has caused both types
of FDI – greenfield investment and cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) – to
decrease in developed countries.2 While themain reason for this move toward stricter reg-
ulation is the acquisition by Chinese state-owned enterprises of sensitive technology and
information in developed countries, FDI regulation is not limited to Chinese FDI. More-
over, restrictions on FDI are prevalent in many industries that are not security-sensitive,
1 According to UNCTAD’sWorld Investment Report 2020, global FDI dropped by more than 50 percent in the
first half of the year compared to 2019.
2 The European Union have gradually imposed stricter FDI regulations on the basis of national security
threat. See Kirkland & Ellis ‘New EU Foreign Direct Investment Regulations Take Effect’, October 29,
2020.
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and sharply vary across countries for the same industries. This indicates that FDI regula-
tion policy reflects concerns beyond national security.
To understand the variation of FDI restrictiveness across industries, I focus on the dif-
ferent types of FDI entry mode and how each type of entry mode affects domestic produc-
ers. In the existing international political economy (IPE) literature, studies have treated
FDI as a single type of investment. To be more accurate, however, FDI should be disag-
gregated into different entry modes. The choice of market entry mode – either greenfield
investment projects or cross-border M&A deals – by foreign multinational corporations
(MNCs) reveals significant information about the investment motivations of MNCs, the
investment climate of the host country, the characteristics of the target industry, and the
possible economic consequences (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007; Müller, 2007; Brouthers and
Brouthers, 2000). Depending on the firm-specific skills of the foreign MNC and the struc-
ture of the domestic market, domestic rival firms will have to prepare for future changes
accordingly. Thus, the entry mode decision of a foreign investor is one of the key determi-
nants of domestic firms’ preferences regarding FDI policy.
I argue that FDI regulations, which reflect the preferences of domestic producers re-
garding inward FDI, will be stricter in industries with more greenfield investments and
looser in industries with more cross-border M&As. While both types of FDI increase do-
mestic market competition, the degree to which competition increases is different between
greenfield investments and cross-border M&As. Cross-border M&As are typically more
frequent in industries with many small- and medium-size firms. As a result, new entries
do not significantly alter the market equilibrium. M&As also involve no (or few) new
entries because foreign MNCs acquire existing domestic firms when entering the mar-
ket. Active cross-border M&As can even increase the value of domestic small businesses,
which are potential targets of foreign acquirers. Moreover, M&As typically result in direct
information and technology spillovers for domestic firms. Therefore, domestic producers
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are favorable to cross-border M&As.
In contrast, greenfield investment projects are typically more frequent in industries
with few large firms that dominate the market. Moreover, greenfield investments often
bring large-scale new entries into the market without positive spillover effects of firm-
specific skills or information. These large new incomers also increase demand for talented
labor, resulting in talent bidding wars. Therefore, domestic producers want protection in
industries withmany greenfield investment projects. These preferences shape the govern-
ment’s FDI regulation policies.
Using the industry-level FDI Restrictiveness Index of 36 high-income countries from
the OECD.Stat database, I examine whether FDI entry modes have different effects on
industry- level FDI regulations. The analysis in this paper is focused on high-income
countries (i.e., the 36 members states in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development [OECD]), because inward FDI in developed and developing countries is
characterized by different motivations and patterns of foreign investment (Blonigen and
Wang, 2004). For instance, MNCs investing abroad are more likely to be efficiency- and
resource-seeking in developing countries, while they are more likely to be information-
and market-seeking in developed countries (Wadhwa and Reddy, 2011; Brouthers, Gao
and McNicol, 2008). Moreover, the types of FDI entry modes are balanced in developed
countries, while FDI that enters developing countries is most likely to be greenfield invest-
ments. In addition, political institutions (e.g., democracy or non-democracy) have signif-
icant effects on the type of inward FDI (Henisz, 2000; Jensen, 2008). This paper therefore
focuses on a set of countries that are politically and economically similar.
I test the hypothesis using data on OECD FDI restrictiveness index, greenfield invest-
ment projects and cross-border M&As worldwide. The choice of entry mode, however,
is inherently endogenous, where FDI restrictiveness may cause changes in the pattern of
MNCs’ entry mode. To account for such reciprocal causation, I utilize industry “total
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expenditures on research and development (R&D)” as an instrumental variable in the
two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimate. Total R&D expenditures have direct relationship
with the choice of FDI entry mode, while they are only remotely relevant to FDI restric-
tiveness. High R&D expenditures, which is a proxy for high technological dynamism,
make the speed of market entry to be a crucial factor in MNCs’ business strategy. Hence,
MNCswould choose cross-borderM&As over greenfield investment to quickly enter local
markets. Admittedly, industries with high R&D expenditure may be associated with low
FDI restrictiveness level through industry feature, as mentioned in Chapter 2; however
the total amount of R&D expenditure do not provide information about whether the in-
cumbent firms only use the technologywithin themselves or they benefit from technology
spillovers within the industry. Thus, total amount of R&D expenditures serves as a good
instrumental variable.
I find evidence that industries with more cross-border M&As relative to greenfield in-
vestments are associatedwith lower FDI restrictiveness, while industrieswithmore green-
field investments relative to cross-border M&As are associated with higher FDI restric-
tiveness. The results are consistent when controlling for the size of the M&A deals. These
results show evidence that domestic producers are more favorable to FDI entering via
cross-border M&As than FDI entering as greenfield projects. Therefore, I conclude that
the type of FDI entry modes plays a crucial role in shaping the preferences of domestic
firms regarding inward FDI policy.
This study of FDI entry modes and domestic firm preferences offers two main contri-
butions to the IPE literature. Firstly, while studies on the politics of FDI have significantly
developed in the past couple of decades, I contend that it is also important to distinguish
between the two different types of FDI entry mode. As greenfield investment is building
a new start-up while a M&A is acquiring an existing firm, the economic consequences of
each entry mode differ in the local market. Moreover, compared to greenfield investment,
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cross-border M&As each year comprise more than half of the total FDI in high-income
countries.3 Secondly, previous studies on FDI regulation have not connected domestic ac-
tors’ preferences with industry characteristics. By focusing on the preferences of domestic
producers, I demonstrate that industry features are crucial in understanding why there
are variations in FDI regulations across industries. With the recent increase in barriers
to FDI in high-income countries, this study of FDI entry modes and domestic firm pref-
erences based on industry characteristics adds to the explanation of FDI restrictiveness
across industries.
3.2 Literature Review: FDI Preferences and Policies
Studies on FDI preferences and policies in the IPE literature have found that democratic in-
stitutions can act as barriers to FDI due to domestic political divergence, interest groups’
resistance, and protectionist labor unions (Owen, 2015; Li and Resnick, 2003). A host
government’s partisanship may also play a role in restricting inbound FDI by favoring
MNCs that complement the factor endowments of the incumbent’s electoral base (Pinto
andPinto, 2008; Pinto, 2013;Malesky andMosley, 2018). Pandya (2014), in contrast, found
that democracies are relatively more open to FDI than nondemocracies because electoral
accountability makes policy makers more attentive to domestic actors’ economic prefer-
ences. However, domestic preferences are not always supportive of FDI. Because MNCs
demand more skilled labor and are generally more productive than domestic firms, low-
skilled laborers feel job insecurity when facing market-oriented FDI (Pandya, 2010, 2014).
While previous studies have progressed understanding of FDI, they treat FDI as a single
type of investment, rather than disaggregating FDI into greenfield investment and cross-
border M&As.
3 See OECD, “FDI in Figures”, April 2021, p.8.
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Several studies on cross-borderM&As have demonstrated that FDI regulation is on the
rise due to national security concerns resulting from the increase in outward FDI by emerg-
ing economies, where many MNCs are state owned (Kang, 1997; Meunier, Burgoon and
Jacoby, 2014). Many developed governments have adopted FDI screening processes for
cross-borderM&As in so-called “crucial” sectors, which have led to transactions being de-
nied and potential investors being discouraged (Marchick and Slaughter, 2008). Sauvant
(2009) also argued that many countries make the FDI regulatory environment more re-
strictive for foreign investors by linking the concept of “national interests” to strategic sec-
tors or national champion companies. If this is really the case, governments should have
tighter restrictions on FDI in industries where cross-border M&As are dominant. How-
ever, in reality, greenfield investments face the same set of regulation policies as M&As.
Thus, the national security factor cannot explain why FDI regulation policies are stricter
in industries in which greenfield investment is the dominant entry mode.
Building upon the existing literature on FDI regulation, this paper explores how two
different entry modes affect FDI policy preferences, particularly from domestic produc-
ers’ perspective. Host governments may regulate FDI based on entry mode in order to
induce more technology transfers to domestic firms, which can improve economic wel-
fare (Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi, 2004). Foreign MNCs, on the other hand, take various
market and nonmarket factors into consideration when choosing their entry model type
Kogut and Singh (1988); Zaheer andMosakowski (1997); Shaver (1998); Siegel, Licht and
Schwartz (2011). Studies have found that foreign MNCs tend to choose greenfield invest-
ment as their primary entry mode when they have a strong competitive advantage (in
terms of firm-specific skills), are entering a market with limited competition, and are fac-
ing low policy barriers (Hennart and Park, 1993; Zejan, 1990; Caves, 1996; Larimo, 2003;
Henisz, 2000). These studies provide insight into the environment in which a domestic
firm is situated when facing the imminent entry of a foreign firm.
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Drawing from several studies on the effect of inward FDI on domestic firms, it is evi-
dent that a new foreign entry is not always good news (Aitken andHarrison, 1999; Haller,
2009). Foreign MNCs often possess higher skills and are more efficient than domestic
firms (Knickerbocker, 1973; Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2012; Bloom et al., 2013). In
fact, Qiu and Wang (2011) demonstrated via a formal model that depending on the na-
tional welfare, which is calculated based on domestic consumers and producers, govern-
ments will enact FDI policies that promote either greenfield investment or cross-border
M&As. This paper expands on these earlier studies and explores how different FDI entry
modes affect domestic firms’ preferences regarding FDI, which are reflected in the host
government’s FDI regulation policies.
The emphasis on FDI entry modes and industry features in this research fills gaps that
exist in both IPE and business literature. While studies in IPE have recently begun to dis-
tinguish between the two different types of FDI entry mode, most studies have focused
on greenfield investment in developing countries, where the presence of cross-border
M&As is relatively negligible. Meanwhile, studies in business have focused more on the
entry mode strategy of MNCs rather than on how these strategies affect domestic produc-
ers. By examining domestic producers’ preferences regarding greenfield investment and
cross-border M&As, I provide another perspective on why FDI regulation varies across
industries. In addition, by highlighting the importance of industry features in shaping
the preferences of domestic producers regarding FDI, this study bridges the gap between
IPE literature, which often focuses on the distributional consequences for individuals, and
business literature, which often focuses on firm strategies.
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3.3 Theory: Domestic Firm Preferences and FDI Policy
3.3.1 Greenfield Investment and Domestic Firms
Greenfield investment is a type of FDI in which a foreign MNC builds its operations in a
foreign country from scratch, like a start-up. Greenfield projects involve the establishment
of new entities, such as offices, buildings, and factories. Thus, greenfield investments gen-
erally entail higher fixed expenditures at the initial setup stage. These investment projects
can be new production facilities, but also additional distribution hubs or subsidiaries of
the parent companies. The foreign subsidiary can either be a wholly foreign-owned enter-
prise (WFOE) or a joint venture co-owned by a local partner with complementary assets
(Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). The purpose of this paper is to compare different types
of majority-owned foreign affiliates, which do not include minority-share joint ventures.
There are numerousmarket and non-market factors that contribute to anMNC’s choice
of greenfield investment as the primary entry mode, but this paper focuses in particular
on market/economic reasons.4 Firstly, foreign MNCs typically enter via greenfield invest-
ment in industries that generate scale economies in the long run. Greenfield projects re-
quire large lump-sum fixed costs in the initial establishment phase; therefore, MNCs will
only enter the market if they expect to achieve profits in the future (Pandya, 2014). Sec-
ondly, there are often firm-specific skills that cannot be cleanly separated intomanagement
and workers’ skills in the business operation. In such cases, a foreign MNC cannot easily
enter via M&A, because M&As involve foreign management replacing the domestic man-
agementwhile domestic workers remain the same. Finally, anMNCwill choose greenfield
4 Foreign companies decide to enter via greenfield if there exist more similarities in culture, language, and
history. Geographic proximity also encourages greenfield investment. Moreover, scholars have also found
that political affinity or lower political risks are often associated with foreign multinationals entering via
greenfield investment. Existence of contractual hazard also increase possibility of greenfield investment.
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investment over cross-border M&A if the MNC possesses sensitive technology that must
be kept within the company in order to maintain its competitiveness.
The above-mentioned reasons behind the choice of entry mode by a foreign MNC also
affect how domestic producers react to greenfield investment. Firstly, domestic producers
will oppose FDI if market competition increases due to large-scale new entries. Greenfield
investment projects often involve large-scale projects because foreign companies want to
recover their initial high fixed costs through generating long-term profits by lowering vari-
able costs. Thus, in industries like oil, mining, and heavy metals, MNCs often enter via
greenfield investment rather than acquiring an existing company. Each new project enter-
ing the local market results in the introduction of a new competitor producing differenti-
ated goods. Large incumbent companieswill consider these large FDI projects to be taking
over a significant amount of market share. Due to the specific industry features, which re-
quire high fixed costs at the initial establishment period and scale economies in the long
run, there is already a high concentration of large domestic firms. As the industries tend
to be oligopolistic, the potential disruption to the market equilibrium is great.
Figure 3.1 shows thismarket-stealing effect of the share of greenfield investment projects
on the net export value (logged) by plotting the regression line. In industries with higher
share of greenfield investment, net export value tends to increase, confirming that goods
and services by the new foreign entries are not directed towards exports, but rather com-
peting for the existing customers. Therefore, domestic incumbent companies will want
protection from FDI entering via greenfield investment.
Secondly, firm-specific skills tend to be more advanced amongMNCs compared to av-
erage local companies.5 MNCs tend to come fromdeveloped countrieswhere technologies
are highly advanced and there are more resources, including managerial and production
5 Nocke and Yeaple (2007) shows that firms engaging in greenfield investment are more efficient than those
engaging in cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
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Figure 3.1: Linear Regression Line of Greenfield Investment and Net Export Value
skills and capital. The technology gap may not be large between domestic and foreign
MNCs, but average domestic companies may be in an inferior position compared to large
foreign MNCs. While incumbent companies may have an advantage in non-market fac-
tors, such as local information or cultural experience, the long-run profit favors foreign
MNCs that produce high-quality goods and services at lower prices using advanced tech-
nology and skills. Domestic MNCswill also oppose such FDI entering themarket because
it means fiercer competition. In order to maintain market dominance, domestic MNCs
would need to find a way to lower their price, either by investing more in R&D or reduc-
ing the markup of their products.
Thirdly, firm-specific skills are not easily transferred to local companies. In addition
to possessing advanced skills, foreign companies often keep these skills within the com-
pany. As such, local companies cannot expect knowledge or information spillovers. As
mentioned above, one of the reasons why MNCs pursue a greenfield investment strategy
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is to maintain their competitiveness by not sharing know-how. This is particularly true if
the motivation for FDI is market oriented and competing for existing customers (Knicker-
bocker, 1973). Some foreignMNCs even locate their factories far away from domestic rival
MNCs to rule out any possibility of information leaks resulting from geographic proxim-
ity (Hanson, 2001). Without any information or technology spillovers, local companies
have no reason to welcome the new entry of a large foreign MNC.
Finally, greenfield investment substantially increases the demand for high-skilled la-
bor, resulting in a talent bidding war between local firms. Under such conditions, foreign
MNCs are likely to pay high wages in order to attract local talent, because local workers
have information on the domestic market and are experienced. Foreign MNCs are also in
need of high-skilled labor because their business operations are typically advanced com-
pared to average local companies (Blonigen and Slaughter, 2001). Thus, from domestic
producers’ perspective, new entries of foreign MNCs are likely to result in increased de-
mand in the high-skilled labor market, resulting in a talent bidding war and increased
wages (Gopinath and Chen, 2003). The increase in competition not only in the product
market but also in the labor market further feeds the anti-FDI sentiment among domestic
producers.
The above logic of why domestic producers are wary of greenfield investment is partic-
ularly true in high-income countries. The same logic may not apply in developing coun-
tries, because more greenfield projects lead to an increase in foreign capital and job cre-
ation, which are crucial for economic development. Moreover, local companies may not
even be present in some of the industries that require large fixed costs. Thus, host govern-
ments in developing countries sometimes not only deregulate FDI policy, but also provide
incentives to attract more foreign capital.
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3.3.2 Cross-border M&As and Domestic Firms
An acquisition is a corporate action taken by a foreign parent company that entails pur-
chasing more than 50% of an existing domestic firm’s ownership. Thus, acquisitions are
different frommergers in that the acquiring company buys the targeted company’s stocks
or assets to obtain control. There are two types of acquisitions, a friendly acquisition and a
hostile takeover. A friendly acquisition happens when the board directors agree to sell the
targeted company’s shares to the potential acquirer. A hostile takeover occurs when the
board directors reject the deal offered by the potential acquirer, but the acquirer neverthe-
less tries to buy the target company by purchasing a controlling share of stocks. Moreover,
an acquirer can be either a company that produces goods and services, a financial com-
pany, or an individual financier. The first case, in which non-financial companies acquire
a domestic company, is the direct alternative to greenfield investment. In the latter two
cases, however, most acquisition transactions are performed when financial companies or
individuals want to resell the company they bought at a profit. This paper focuses on the
acquisitions made by non-financial companies.
As in the case of greenfield investment, there are numerous market and non-market
factors that contribute to a foreign MNC’s choice of entering a local market via cross-
border M&As. This section focuses on market factors.6 MNCs often choose M&As as
their primary entry mode to avoid the large fixed costs in the setup stage by simply ac-
quiring a domestic company. For this reason, cross-border M&As are most frequent in
industries that have many small- and medium-size local companies, which are attractive
potential targets for M&As. In addition, MNCs choose cross-border M&As when their
owners’ management skills and the workers’ skills are readily separable, because firms
6 There are also non-market strategies that affect the entry mode decision of multinationals. Firms are more
likely to enter via cross-border M&As if the acquiror do not have much information or knowledge about
the local market due to lack of experience. Furthermore, differences in corporate culture or high political
risk may also encourage foreign investors to enter via cross-border M&As.
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can increase profits by introducing better management to enhance production.
The above-mentioned reasons form the basis for domestic producers’ preferences re-
garding regulation of cross-borderM&As. Firstly, industrieswithmany cross-borderM&As
already have large numbers of small- and medium-size incumbent firms; therefore, a few
new additions to the market do not alter the market equilibrium. As previously men-
tioned, cross-border M&As are most frequent in industries where there are many afford-
able potential targets. In markets that resemble perfect competition, additional entries
will not make a significant difference in the price. With many small- and medium-size
domestic firms existing in the market, foreign entries do not lead to immediate changes
in prices that are set in the local market. Moreover, average cross-border M&A deals are
much smaller in scale compared to average greenfield investment projects. Thus, the mar-
ket equilibrium price is likely to be further undisturbed. Even if cross-border M&As may
result in higher productivity in the long run due to synergistic effects, studies have found
that merged companies need an adjustment period, which often leads to relatively poor
performance due to corporate cultural differences (King et al., 2004; Bertrand andZitouna,
2008; Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee and Jayaraman, 2009). This effect may give domestic
firms time to react accordingly to the potential market changes in the short term. Since the
effect of FDI on the market is relatively negligible, incumbent domestic firms are indiffer-
ent towards FDI of this type.
Secondly, market competition may either remain the same or become reduced as a
result of cross-border M&As. As foreign MNCs enter the market by acquiring an existing
domestic firm, the total number of competitors usually remains the same. In other cases, if
an existing foreign affiliate acquires an existing domestic firm, the number of competitors
may even be reduced. From domestic producers’ point of view, no new entry is better
than an increase in new entries. In addition to such market-neutral effect, FDI entering
via cross-border M&As tends to be directed towards more exports within the industry.
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As shown in Figure 3.2, in industries with higher share of cross-border M&A deals, goods
and services are more likely to be exported, unlike in the case of greenfield investment,
which has market-stealing effects. Figure 3.2 plots the regression line between the share of
cross-borderM&As in each industry and logged value of net exports. As a result, domestic
producers are relatively unconcerned about FDI increasing the market competition.
Figure 3.2: Linear Regression Line of Cross-border M&A and Net Export Value
Thirdly, active cross-border M&As increase the share prices of small domestic firms
that are likely to be targets for acquisition. Indeed, some incumbent firmswelcome foreign
firms’ active M&A behavior, because higher M&A demand increases their overall share
prices. Studies demonstrate that the value of targeted firms increases significantly each
time there has been awave ofM&A activities worldwide (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004).
Cross-borderM&As increase target firms’ value evenmore than domestic M&As, because
foreign firms often pay large premiums for successful bids (Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992).
Thus, domestic firms, particularly small- and medium-size businesses that are likely to be
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the targets of foreign multinational acquirers, welcome FDI in their industries.
Finally, while foreign acquirers’ firm-specific skills aremore advanced compared to av-
erage domestic firms, these skills are directly transferred to local companies. M&As allow
the transfer of managerial skills and technology, which are crucial to firms’ development.
Acquiring an existing domestic company will lead to more spillovers than a greenfield
investment project would, because the existing company is more integrated into the lo-
cal supply chain and interacts more with local competitors. In the process of merging,
two companies often reorganize and enhance their R&D activities (Röller, Stennek and
Verboven, 2000). This process makes re-training local workers and managers with new
technology/skills more conducive to spillovers between firms. Such technology transfers
particularly benefit the targeted domestic firms because foreign acquirers use advanced
skills to better perform in the local market (Bertrand and Zuniga, 2006). Therefore, do-
mestic producers welcome FDI that generates positive externalities.
While cross-border M&As do not pose a greater threat on average compared to green-
field investment, there are two cases in which cross-border M&As may be a larger threat
to domestic companies. Firstly, cross-border M&As may give the foreign acquirer a large
market share with considerable market power. Secondly, both companies and the govern-
ment fear national security breaches due to the information transfers inherent in the nature
of M&As. The first scenario is true if a global MNC tries to enter an oligopolistic market
through cross-border M&A. These markets are also those that have more greenfield in-
vestment; therefore, there is no overall effect on FDI restrictiveness.7 The second scenario
applies in security-sensitive industries, such as information or electricity, or if the country
of nationality of the acquirer is not a security ally. Thus, greenfield investment will be
more frequent in industries that are security sensitive, which goes hand in hand with the
7 While these industries do have a few number of M&A deals, greenfield investment projects are more
frequent, resulting in higher FDI restrictiveness.
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government’s regulation of FDI. In order to account for this endogeneity, I describe below
an instrumental variable strategy.
3.3.3 Domestic Firm Preferences and FDI Policy
Governments have a few constituencies whose varying preferences regarding FDI influ-
ence the regulatory restrictiveness toward inward FDI. First, incumbent domestic firms
may either support or oppose FDI depending on whether the foreign entries will increase
market competition in favor or against them. Second, while domestic workers may sup-
port inward FDI due to job creation, studies have found that workers’ preferences vary
across industries (Owen, 2013; Pinto and Pinto, 2008). Thirdly, consumers may support
inward FDI because FDI increases consumer welfare by introducing a variety of goods at
lower prices. Fourth, foreign firms already located in the localmarketmay also havemixed
attitudes towards inward FDI, depending on whether the newly entering foreign MNC is
a rival to the incumbent foreign firms. In the face of the diverging interests of these con-
stituencies, governments are likely to listen to producers’ demands, mainly because they
are better organized and have more political resources compared to other constituencies,
such as consumers or incumbent foreignMNCs. These domestic firms have political influ-
ence either financially or through personal ties and thus can influence the government’s
FDI policy in their favor (Faccio, 2006). Therefore, domestic producers, particularly larger
ones, have more influence over FDI policy-making compared to domestic consumers or
foreign MNCs.
Domestic producers in industries with many greenfield investment projects are likely
to oppose FDI. Large-scale foreign entries in markets that are highly concentrated among
a few large companies will likely create even more intensifying competition. Without any
knowledge or information spillover from foreign entries to domestic incumbents, the com-
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petitionwould further increase. The possibility of a talent biddingwar in the labormarket
also contributes to the anti-FDI sentiment among domestic producers. Since the threat to
market and labor competition is high, domestic producers are likely to demand protection
via strict FDI regulations. Moreover, these large domestic companies have better means
to access the political decision-making process. Therefore, industries with a high share of
greenfield investment projects are more likely to have relatively strict FDI regulations.
In contrast, domestic producers in industries with many cross-border M&As are more
likely to be favorable to FDI. In an industry with many existing competitors, new entries
of foreign MNCs via M&As do not matter much to the existing market equilibrium and
may even reduce market competition. Moreover, since these industries have many small-
and medium-size firms, active cross-border M&As increase the share prices of domestic
incumbent firms. Domestic producers are also lesswary of FDI in these industries because
they expect sharing of information, technology, and advanced skills with foreign MNCs
through M&As. Therefore, industries with a high share of cross-border M&As are likely
to be associated with relatively loose FDI regulations.
Hypothesis: Industries with a greater share of greenfield investments are
likely to have higher FDI restrictiveness than industries with a greater share
of cross-border M&As.
3.4 Data and Methodology
The main dependent variable in this research is the OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index,
which is available through the OECD Statistics database. This index include the years
2003, 2006, and 2010-2019. The unit of analysis is at the industry level, where there are 30
separate industries. To match the industries with independent variables, however, I used
the aggregated industry category, which is divided into 11 separate industries. There are
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four types of FDI restrictions: equity restrictions, screening and approval requirements,
restrictions on foreign key personnel, and other.8 In themain analysis, I utilized “all types”
of restrictions, which is the summation encompassing all four types. Relevant data were
available for 68 countries, including 36 OECDmember countries and 32 non-OECD coun-
tries. I mainly analyzed my theory for the 36 OECD countries, because these countries
have a sufficient amount of greenfield investment projects and cross-border M&A deals.9
Greenfield Investment Data
The best data for global greenfield investment projects is available via the fDi Markets
database managed by the Financial Times. This database includes all individual global
greenfield investment projects worldwide. I aggregated individual projects at the indus-
try level for each country, then calculated the share of greenfield investments in each in-
dustry by dividing the number of greenfield projects by the sum of greenfield projects
and cross-border M&As. In order to match the industry categorization of the FDI Restric-
tiveness Index, I referred to all information available in the dataset, including “industry,”
“subsector,” “industry activity,” and “(industry) cluster.” For example, if the industry
was “leisure and entertainment” and the industry cluster was ‘tourism’, I classified the
industry under “hotels and restaurants.” However, if the industry was “leisure and enter-
tainment” and the cluster was ‘retail trade,” I classified the industry under “retail.”
Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions Data
The total number of cross-border M&A deals was calculated based on the data avail-
able via SDC Platinum. The SDC Platinum database includes comprehensive data on all
individual M&A transactions – both domestic and international – worldwide. For cross-
border M&A transactions, I only included transactions that involve a pair of companies
with differing parent company nations. For instance, even if a Chinese company acquired
8 Other types include operational restrictions such as limits on purchase of land or on repatriation of profits
and capital.
9 Regressions on each type of restriction and non-OECD countries are reported in the Appendix section.
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a United States company, if the ultimate parent company of the United States company
was Chinese, I did not regard it as a cross-border M&A transaction. However, if a United
States company acquired another United States company but the latter had a Chinese par-
ent company, I regarded this transaction as a cross-border M&A. For industry classifica-
tion, I referred to the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification code and matched it
with the closest industry category in the FDI Restrictiveness Index. I then aggregated
each transaction at the industry level by country and year. Finally, I calculated the share
of cross-border M&As in each industry by dividing the number of M&A deals by the sum
of greenfield projects and cross-border M&A deals.
Control Variables
I used several control variables to account for alternative explanations for FDI restric-
tiveness.10 First, domestic firms may welcome cross-border M&As if they involve smaller
acquisition targets and thus cause their own firm prices to rise because of acquisition ex-
pectations. If this is the case, industries with many small targets, or small-size companies,
will have lower FDI restrictiveness. Since small companies often do not involve high fixed
capital, I use “consumption of fixed capital (CFCC)” as a proxy for the availability of small
targets. If CFCC is high, there will be fewer small targets, while low CFCC indicates many
small targets. High CFCC industries will likely have high FDI restrictiveness. Thus, I
expect CFCC to have a positive relationship with the FDI Restrictiveness Index.
Second, domestic firms’ perceptions of greenfield investment projects may depend on
whether they expect to lose their own key talent (skilled labor) to a talent bidding war.
This expectation may in turn depend on talent scarcity in the overall local labor market.
If this is the case, the cost of labor should increase due to the increase in labor demand. I
used “labor costs (LABR)” as a proxy for changes in the local labor market. An increase
10Data on the control variables can be found at OECD.Stat database. I mainly use “Structural Analaysis"
data under “Industry and Services."
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in LABR is likely to be associated with lower FDI restrictiveness, because active FDI is
correlated with greater competition for labor, which leads to increases in the cost of labor.
Thus, I expect LABR to exhibit a negative relationship with the FDI Restrictiveness Index.
Third, domestic firms’ perceptions of greenfield investment and cross-border M&As
may depend on whether the foreign entrant has a reputation for helping average local
industry prices or if the foreign entrant is known for engaging in price wars. In the former
case, extra value added over the original price will either not change or increase, while
in the latter case, extra value added over the original price will decrease such that that
companies can further lower the price of their products. Thus, I used “value added at
factor costs (VAFC)” as a proxy for changes to price within an industry. VAFC matters
more in industries with large companies that have a significant impact on market prices.
Thus, changes in VAFC – regardless of whether the price increases or decreases – would
be associated with high FDI restrictiveness.
Fourth, domestic firms may welcome both cross-border M&As and greenfield invest-
ments because of the geographic location of the investment. For instance, inward FDI
into existing agglomeration locations may lead to spillovers, while investment into geo-
graphically distanced domestic locations may result in few or no spillovers. To account
for geographic clustering, I included the “number of persons engaged/total employment
(EMPN)” variable. WhenLABR andEMPNare high, the industry is likely to be geograph-
ically concentrated, and when both LABR and EMPN are low, the industry is likely to be
sparsely located. Finally, I included “taxes less subsidies on products (OTXS)” to account
for governmental tax incentive policies granted to companies. Higher OTXS industries
will be associated with lower FDI restrictiveness, as those industries are financially sup-
ported by the government.
R&D Expenditures as the Instrumental Variable
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While the number of greenfield investment projects or cross-border M&As may affect
the FDI regulation policy in different industries, reverse causation is also possible: regula-
tion policy may affect FDI behavior. Restrictions on inward FDI may deter foreign MNCs
from entering a certain industry via greenfield investment because theywould have to pay
even higher costs at the initial setup stage on top of an already high fixed cost. Similarly,
industries with low barriers to FDI may cause many foreign MNCs to enter the market,
either through cross-border M&As or greenfield investment. These possibilities compli-
cate identification of the independent effects of greenfield investment and M&As on FDI
restrictions.
To account for this endogeneity issue between the share of each type of FDI and FDI
restrictiveness, I tested the hypothesis using a two-stage least square (2SLS) method with
an instrumental variable. I used industry-level data on R&D Expenditure as a proxy for in-
dustry features that affect the number of greenfield investment projects and cross-border
M&As.11 R&D expenditures are typically high in industries where technologies change
and advance quickly. A foreign MNC is more likely to choose cross-border M&A as its
market entry mode when the speed of entry is crucial due to fast-changing technology.
Therefore, R&D expenditures directly affect the number of cross-border M&As in indus-
tries where technological dynamism is high. In contrast, as greenfield investments require
a longer time to establish a business, MNCs tend to choose greenfield investment when
they are less sensitive to technological dynamism.
As for the relationship between R&D expenditures and FDI restrictiveness, the two
variables may be associated through industry features mentioned in Chapter 2, but the
total amount of R&D expenditures itself do not provide any information on whether the
incumbent firms benefit from their own R&D or from the R&D of the entire industry. This
is particularly true in high-income countries, where large domestic firms in industrieswith
11Business enterprise R&D expenditure data is available from OECD Stat database.
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high international economies of scale also possess competitive skills through their own
R&D expenditures within the firm. Thus, I expect that R&D expenditures will affect FDI
restrictiveness only via their effect on the relative prevalence of the two types of FDI.
Stage 1: Xit = Zitδ + eit (3.1)
In stage 1, I estimated the effect of R&D expenditure (Zit) on the share of each type of
FDI: greenfield investment projects and cross-border M&A deals (Xit).
Stage 2: yit = α + X̂itβ + Uitγ + εit (3.2)
In stage 2, I tested the hypothesis using the estimates from stage 1 (X̂it). I used a panel
linearmodel with time (t, year) and group (i =country and industry pair) fixed effects for
the models in both stages. X represents the total amount of FDI (either greenfield invest-
ment projects or cross-border M&A deals). U represents the control variables including
LABR, EMPN, VAFC, OTXS, and CFCC.
3.5 Results
Table 3.1 details the effect of each FDI type on FDI restrictiveness without control vari-
ables. Models (1) and (2) are reduced forms that do not include the instrumental variable,
while models (3) and (4) are the 2SLS regression results using R&D expenditure as the
instrumental variable. The results of the reduced formmodels support the first part of my
hypothesis, which states that industries with a higher share of greenfield investment are
more likely to have higher FDI restrictiveness. However, it is unclear whether industries
with a higher share of cross-border M&As are more likely to have lower FDI restrictive-
ness. Models (3) and (4) produced the expected results: industries with a higher share
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of greenfield investment are more likely to have stricter FDI regulations, while industries
with a higher share of cross-border M&As are more likely to have looser FDI regulations.
However, by including an instrumental variable, the total observation has been signifi-
cantly reduced, which may cause biased results. That said, in looking at all the models,
there is evidence that industries with more greenfield investment relative to the share of
M&As are more likely to have stricter regulations on inward FDI.
Table 3.1: FDI Entry Modes and FDI Restrictiveness
Dependent variable: FDI Restrictiveness
Reduced Form 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of M&A 0.004
(0.004)
Share of Greenfield 0.016∗∗∗
(0.005)
Share of M&A′ −3.116∗∗∗
(0.573)
Share of Greenfield′ 4.091∗∗∗
(0.752)
Observations 13,950 13,950 4,866 4,866
R2 0.406 0.406 0.461 0.461
Adjusted R2 0.402 0.403 0.454 0.454
Residual Std. Error 0.138 (df = 13872) 0.138 (df = 13872) 0.089 (df = 4805) 0.089 (df = 4805)
Fixed Effects C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y
Note: C=country, I=Industry, Y=year ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.2 presents the regression result of the share of each FDI entry mode type on
FDI restrictions including the control variables. As in Table 3.1, the first two models are
reduced forms without instrumental variables, while models (3) and (4) include R&D
expenditure as the instrumental variable. While model (1) revealed the opposite result
of what the theory expects, models (2) to (4) support the hypothesis. In model (2), a
higher share of greenfield investment projects is associatedwith higher FDI restrictiveness.
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The positive association is consistent even when the instrumental variable is included in
model (4). Model (3) also found a negative and statistically strong association between
the industries with a higher share of cross-border M&As and FDI restrictiveness. This
finding means that industries with a higher share of cross-border M&As are more likely
to have lower FDI restrictiveness. Thus, it is safe to conclude that industries with higher
shares of greenfield investment relative to cross-border M&As are more likely to demand
stricter regulations on inward FDI. In short, FDI entry mode matters in the variation of
FDI restrictiveness across industries.
The control variables demonstrate some interesting results. First, the logged value of
labor costs (LABR), which is the proxy for labor demand or labor availability, is positively
associated with FDI restrictiveness. This indicates that the higher the demand for labor
in an industry (which also affects the cost of labor), the higher the FDI restrictiveness in-
dex. In other words, an increase in the cost of labor (perhaps due to an increase in labor
demand or higher competition for talented labor) is more likely to increase FDI restric-
tiveness. Second, the logged value of total employment (EMPN), which is the proxy for
industry agglomeration, demonstratesmixed results: this variable is negatively associated
with the FDI restrictiveness value in the reduced formmodels, but positively associated at
a statistically significant level with FDI restrictiveness in the 2SLS models. In considering
only models (3) and (4), the positive association indicates that when industry agglom-
eration is high, FDI restrictiveness also tends to increase, perhaps because industries are
highly concentrated among a few large companies. These large companies are likely to
pressure the government for stricter regulations on inward FDI to prevent an increase in
market competition. Third, value added at factor costs (VAFC), which is the proxy for
price changes, is negatively associated with FDI restrictiveness, indicating that industries
with significant changes in prices tend to have lower FDI restrictiveness. Furthermore, the
other taxes less subsidies (OTXS) variable is negatively correlatedwith FDI restrictiveness,
69
Table 3.2: Entry Modes and FDI Restrictiveness (With Control Variables)
Dependent variable: FDI Restrictiveness
Reduced Form 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of M&A 0.013∗∗
(0.006)
Share of Greenfield 0.015∗∗
(0.008)
Share of M&A′ −2.256∗∗∗
(0.550)
Share of Greenfield′ 3.503∗∗∗
(0.854)
log.LABR 0.062∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
log.EMPN −0.009 −0.007 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
log.VAFC −0.042∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
log.CFCC −0.008∗ −0.008∗ 0.008∗ 0.008∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
OTXS −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 4,350 4,350 3,385 3,385
R2 0.361 0.361 0.399 0.399
Adjusted R2 0.352 0.352 0.389 0.389
Residual Std. Error 0.098 (df = 4292) 0.098 (df = 4292) 0.080 (df = 3329) 0.080 (df = 3329)
Fixed Effects C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y
Note: C=country, I=Industry, Y=year ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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which indicates that government subsidies go hand in hand with looser FDI regulations.
Finally, consumption of fixed capital (CFCC), a proxy for whether there are many small
M&A targets available, is negatively associated with the FDI restrictiveness index in the
reduced form, while positively associated in the 2SLS form.
Finally, I present results using a disaggregated version of FDI restrictiveness, which
includes foreign equity limitations, screening and approval mechanisms, restrictions on
hiring foreign key personnel, and other operational restrictions (e.g. capital repatriation
or branching). The results that include instrumental variable are consistent with the re-
gression models with the 2SLS results in Tables 3.1 and 3.3. Industries with higher share
of greenfield investments are more likely to have higher restrictiveness in all types of FDI
restrictions. Therefore, these results provide evidence for my theory on FDI entry modes
and FDI regulation.
3.6 Conclusion and Future Research
How do domestic producers perceive foreign entries? Does the entry mode of FDI mat-
ter to domestic producers? The empirical analysis in this paper suggests that FDI entry
modes matter to domestic producers and influence variations in FDI restrictiveness levels
across industries. Cross-border M&As do not pose as much a threat to domestic produc-
ers as greenfield investments. M&As often involve the elimination of existing competitors,
an increase in stock prices, and the direct transfer of valuable knowledge. Greenfield in-
vestments, however, often involve an increase in the number of competitors with no direct
transfer of knowledge or information. Thus, greenfield investments are more disruptive
to the local market, posing a greater threat to domestic incumbent producers than cross-
border M&As.
By analyzing the FDI Restrictiveness Index of 11 industries in 36 OECD countries in the
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Figure 3.3: FDI Entry Modes and Other Types of Restrictions
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years 2003, 2006, and 2010-2019, I found evidence for both patterns. In order to account
for the endogeneity inherent in the relationship between the two types of FDI entrymodes
and FDI restrictiveness level, I utilized R&D expenditures as an instrumental variable and
used the two-stage least square method to test my hypotheses. The findings indicate that
industries with higher R&D expenditures tend to have a higher percentage of cross-border
M&As and a lower share of greenfield investment. Using the fitted values obtained from
the first regression, I tested the effect of the share of each type of FDI entry mode on the
FDI regulatory restrictiveness level. The findings indicate that industries withmore cross-
border M&As are more likely to have looser FDI restrictions, while industries with more
greenfield investments are more likely to have stricter FDI restrictions. These results are
consistent even when including important control variables. Therefore, FDI entry modes
matter to domestic producers’ preferences regarding inward FDI policy.
In future research, I plan on applying different empirical methods, such as system gen-
eralized method of moments (GMM), to account for Nickell-bias and endogeneity. An-
other appropriate empirical model would be a multilevel model using linear mixed ef-
fects to account for country-level effects. Moreover, some of the control variables should
be replaced with better proxies. For instance, value added factor costs and total employ-
ment do not accurately capture the presence of price wars or geographic agglomeration.
Finally, there are other contingencies that may affect the way domestic firms perceive in-
ward cross-borderM&As and greenfield investment. For instance, theway domestic firms
view inward cross-border M&A and greenfield investment may depend on whether they
perceive that an M&A transaction or a greenfield project will lead to a removal of tacit or
explicit collusion by industry incumbents. In another case, domestic firms’ perception of
cross-border M&As and greenfield investment could depend on whether the foreign en-
trant is expected to be investing in market expansion or competing for existing customers.
Domestic firms’ perceptions of cross-border M&As and greenfield investment could also
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depend on whether the foreign entrant is expected to follow a low cost or differentiation
strategy. Therefore, further research on domestic firms’ preferences regarding inward FDI




Disguised Protectionism: Competition Laws and
National Security Policies as Barriers to
Cross-border M&As
4.1 Introduction
One of themain drivers of 21st century globalization is the transnational activities ofmulti-
national corporations (MNCs) and foreign direct investment (FDI). Although the general
trend of FDI flow is increasing, many countries have recently adopted restrictivemeasures
on inward FDI by imposing stricter competition policy or institutionalizing national secu-
rity reviews. While these regulations are meant to protect consumers and the broader
public, the recent changes have left foreign MNCs in a relatively disadvantaged position
compared to domestic firms. In developed countries, where both types of FDI – green-
field investment and cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&As) – are highly ac-
tive, regulations on CBM&As have become particularly politicized due to the increase in
Chinese M&As in developed countries. The regulations, however, are not limited to Chi-
nese CBM&A activities and have discouraging effects on CBM&As from other countries.
Rather than addressing legitimate concerns about national security or competition, regu-
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lations that hinder FDI may instead be contributing to protectionism and global economic
disorder.
Do governments seek to protect domestic industries from competition by restricting
CBM&As? An increase in international competition as a result of CBM&As disrupts do-
mestic markets more than imports do, especially in sectors where goods are relatively
hard to trade. Domestic incumbent companies are likely to oppose a foreign MNC enter-
ing the market via CBM&A, because the new merged/acquired firm is likely to increase
market competition by introducing new goods and services. Moreover, the targeted do-
mestic firms (or acquired firms) are better equipped with advanced technology andman-
agement skills. In contrast, domestic firms would be less worried about an incumbent
domestic firm acquiring another incumbent domestic firm, because the changes are less
substantial. Therefore, I argue that domestic firms and industries will seek insulation
from profit-lowering international competition by securing restrictions on M&As by for-
eign firms.
Host governments are susceptible to the demands of domestic producers, who have
means and resources to influence the government’s policy-making. Moreover, govern-
ments have incentive to protect “national champion" companies’ competitiveness against
foreign MNCs. Because of limits on overt restrictions of FDI, host governments are in-
centivized to use subtler forms of restrictions. I focus on two main types of regulations
that govern M&A activities: competition policies (or antitrust regulations) and national
security reviews. Competition laws (also antitrust laws) and entry screening/approval
regulations are often conveniently used by the host government in order to protect do-
mestic industries from CBM&As, especially when the global ultimate owners (GUOs or
ultimate parent companies) of the acquiring companies are of foreign nationality. There-
fore, I hypothesize that governments will utilize competition laws and national security
reviews to protect domestic firms against CBM&As led by foreign MNCs.
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I test these arguments using the Services TradeRestrictiveness Index (STRI), constructed
from statistics from theOrganization for EconomicDevelopment andCo-operation (OECD).
The dataset covers 36 OECDmember states over the past seven years (2014-2020). I focus
on the service sectors because trade in services inevitably includes FDI activities andmuch
of FDI in developed countries are concentrated in services. For the dependent variable,
I utilize global M&A transactions data from SDC Platinum database. I separated M&As
into four types: (1) CBM&As led by foreign GUOs, (2) CBM&As led by domestic GUOs,
(3) domesticM&As led by foreign GUOs, and (4) domesticM&As led by domestic GUOs.
Types (1) and (2) are both CBM&As, but a company may have a foreign or domestic ul-
timate parent company. The same applies to domestic M&A deals. This paper focuses on
the comparison between types (1) and (2) for the accurate analysis of whether govern-
ments treat domestic MNCs and foreign MNCs differently. Moreover, national security
reviews are only applied to CBM&As regardless of the GUO nationality, so two different
types of CBM&As serves the purpose of this paper. To control for large CBM&As, I also
examine a subset of data on the top 20% largest deals.
By examining the effects of competition laws and foreign entry restrictions on the num-
ber of different types of CBM&As, I find that both types of regulation disproportionately
discourage M&As that involve foreign global parents compared to M&As with domes-
tic global parents. These results are largely consistent, even when the data are isolated
to large-scale CBM&A deals. Moreover, I find that foreign entry restrictions are applied
even in industries that are not security-sensitive. Thus, domestic laws governing M&As
are likely to discriminate against CBM&A deals by foreign affiliates whose GUOs are also
foreign and to favor CBM&As by foreign affiliates whose ultimate parent companies are
domestic. I therefore conclude that governments of developed countries use competition
laws and national security regulations to protect domestic firms from CBM&As led by
foreign MNCs.
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This research on CBM&As and regulations on inward FDI offers three contributions
to the field of international political economy (IPE). First, I investigate the preferences of
domestic producers regarding inward FDI from the market competition perspective. Ex-
isting studies on domestic interests and FDI regulation have emphasized the importance of
political institutions and the economic impact of FDI on individuals. Building upon those
studies, this paper highlights a relatively under-studied aspect of FDI in the IPE literature:
market competition and domestic producers’ preferences regarding inward FDI. Second,
I focus on a particular type of FDI, CBM&As, which has recently become one of the major
issues in the study of FDI.While research on the politics of FDI is extensive, CBM&As have
not been independently studied. Moreover, I demonstrate the importance of the nation-
ality of the foreign acquirers’ parent companies by examining the information on GUOs.
Third, I show how governments, and the protection-seeking domestic firms they repre-
sent, strategically use apparently neutral areas of domestic policy – such as antitrust – or
seemingly limited but actually highly flexible rules – those on national security review –
in order to discriminate against foreign firms. This paper therefore explores a neglected
topic in IPE , the politics of M&As, and demonstrates how regulatory standards in this
area are politicized to defend narrow economic interests.
4.2 Political Determinants of Cross-border M&As
The question of what factors drive CBM&A transactions is one of the most well-studied
fields in both business and economics literature. Many scholars argue that gravity-related
determinants – such as geographical distance, colonial experience, legal origin, language
and religious familiarity – significantly increase the number of CBM&As (Harzing, 2003;
Malhotra, Sivakumar and Zhu, 2011; Li et al., 2017; Siegel, Licht and Schwartz, 2011). Sev-
eral studies have found that the “liability of foreignness" often results in higher costs and
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poor performance of foreign MNCs after CBM&A transactions (Zaheer andMosakowski,
1997). Other studies have examined the macroeconomic indicators that affect firms’ de-
cisions to enter foreign markets via CBM&As. These studies have concluded that the
development of financial markets (e.g., stock prices), economic performance (e.g., GDP
growth), exchange rates and interest rates have a negative effect on inward CBM&As
(Vasconcellos and Kish, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Boateng et al., 2014; Uddin and
Boateng, 2011). These studies highlight the importance of existing country-specific fea-
tures and economic conditions that affect the decision by MNCs to enter foreign markets
via CBM&As.
One important driver of CBM&As are country-level policies that seek to entice or re-
strict foreign investment, including M&As by foreign acquirers. Regarding the political
determinants of CBM&As, researchers have analyzed the impact of political institutional
distance, property rights protection, and taxation policies on the locational choice ofM&A
deals (Levine, Demirgüç-Kunt andBeck, 2001; Collins et al., 2009; Erel, Liao andWeisbach,
2012; Hebous, Ruf andWeichenrieder, 2011). While these studies offer significant insights
into why certain countries have more inward CBM&As compared to others, their focus is
at the country level, where the total number of M&As is aggregated. This focus does
not explain the intricate regulations that developed countries have recently imposed (e.g.,
industrial policies). Horn and Levinsohn (2001) found that the liberalization of interna-
tional trade will induce countries to use competition policies to promote national interests
at the expense of others.
Few studies have directly incorporated industry-specific tests on the effects of merger
laws on CBM&As. For instance, previous studies have demonstrated that CBM&As are
less likely to succeed in completion of the transaction compared to domestic M&As due
to merger control laws (Conybeare and Kim, 2010; Evenett, 2002; Yan, 2018). These stud-
ies indicate that many countries treat CBM&A deals differently from domestic deals via a
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screening process. The effects are particularly significant in industries that are considered
security sensitive. Other studies have explored how regulations, such as pre-merger ap-
proval and competition laws, discourage CBM&As. In contrast, scholars have found that
the deregulation of service sectors increases CBM&As (Boudier and Lochard, 2013).
In many cases, CBM&A regulations are applied as dyadic policies, through which
countries resist foreign acquirers from specific countries. Several studies have found ev-
idence of discrimination against foreign MNCs in CBM&As in the United States (U.S.)
by the U.S. government, particularly when the CBM&A deals become publicly politicized
through media (Tingley et al., 2015; Kang, 1997; Jackson, 2006). The CBM&A activities of
Chinese companies have recently received extensive attention from the media. Meunier,
Burgoon and Jacoby (2014) specifically discussed the politics of hosting Chinese FDI and
argued that a growing number of EUmember states are becoming more resistant towards
ChineseCBM&As. Such high resistance against ChineseCBM&As ismainly due to the fact
that the Chinese acquirers are often state-owned enterprises, which poses an immediate
national security threat (Zhang, Zhou and Ebbers, 2011). What is missing in the litera-
ture, however, is acknowledgement that, while China has been the center of the CBM&A
regulation topic in the past decade, it was Japan in the 1980s and Middle Eastern coun-
tries in the early 2000s that received the most attention by in U.S. reviews of cross-border
M&As (Kang, 1997; Jackson, 2006). Thus, studies should not only broaden the scope of
industry-specific characteristics, in addition to national security considerations, that deter
CBM&As, but also conduct more comprehensive cross-country analyses on what affects
CBM&A transactions.
Buildingupon these previousworks, I address two specific regulations that deterCBM&As
to a greater extent than domestic M&As. In doing so, I distinguish the nationality of the
foreign acquirers’ GUO as either domestic or foreign to accurately assess the effects of
M&A regulations on the behavior of “foreign” firms. The comparison between the domes-
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tic or foreign nationality of GUOs is important because the nationality of the immediate
ownership of a foreign MNC only reveals partial information about the acquirer. There
are many cases where foreign MNCs acquire their own foreign affiliates, but are labeled
as CBM&A deals. Domestic MNCs located abroad may also acquire one of their affiliates
in the domestic market, but the deals are similarly considered CBM&As. Therefore, I look
at the nationality of the global parent companies to examine how regulation policies are
applied differently to foreign GUOs and domestic GUOs in CBM&As.
4.3 Regulation on Cross-Border M&As
4.3.1 The Rise of Cross-border M&As
Regulations on CBM&As have long been one of the top political issues in developed coun-
tries. where CBM&As comprise more than half of inward FDI. In contrast, greenfield in-
vestments are more frequent in developing countries. Despite the fluctuations, CBM&A
trends since the 1990s have been increasing in both value and number. As illustrated in
Figure 4.1, CBM&As are particularly frequent in services industries, where foreign ac-
quirers have a relatively easy time finding affordable targets.1 Moreover, around 80-90%
of CBM&As worldwide are completed in developed countries, and around 70-80% of the
number of CBM&A transactions worldwide are in service sectors. Thus, the empirical
analyses in this paper focus on CBM&As in the service sector of developed countries.
1 Data on the aggregate number and value of cross-borderM&As are from the annex tables of the UNCTAD
World Investment Report 2020.
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Figure 4.1: Cross-border M&A Trends (1990-2020)
4.3.2 Regulations on Cross-border M&As
Increasing CBM&As in developed countries may come with many benefits, such as tech-
nology transfers, information spillovers, and introduction of better management skills.
However, what if CBM&As result in foreign MNCs dominating the domestic market by
reducing the competitiveness of domestic rival firms? Domestic rival companies may be
wary of foreign MNCs entering the local market via CBM&As, because these MNCs are
more efficient than average domestic firms. While targeted domestic firms may benefit
from M&A deals, other incumbent firms will have to adjust their business operations –
such as spending more on research and development – in order to maintain their mar-
ket share. However, domestic firms’ preferences regarding CBM&As may not necessarily
be reflected in regulation policies. In fact, the main actor that enacts the policy, the host
government, could be favorable to CBM&As for many reasons, such as to encourage the
inflow of foreign capital or to protect consumers by fostering market competition. Never-
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theless, there are two reasons why host governments are likely to represent the interests
of domestic firms.
First, domestic firms have the means to take political action to prevent foreign MNCs
from entering domestic markets via M&As. These political actions include formal lobby-
ing as well as informal efforts, such as leveraging personal connections or offering bribes
(Faccio, 2006). As such, domestic firms, particularly large firms that have significant eco-
nomic resources, hold an advantage compared to foreign mergers/acquirors (Hillman,
Keim and Schuler, 2004).2 For this reason, many foreign MNCs choose minority-owned
joint ventures when going abroad to ensure better treatment by the host government
(Johns and Wellhausen, 2016; Henisz, 2000). Unlike joint ventures, however, a CBM&A
transaction changes the majority ownership from domestic to foreign nationality. Thus,
domestic firms have more influence over the government’s regulation policy on CBM&As
than foreign firms.
Second, host governments are more sympathetic to domestic firms than to foreign
MNCs. Even if the targeted industry is not considered “sensitive” to the national secu-
rity interest, a change in the nationality of a domestic firm is often politicized in the me-
dia, which affects the FDI policy preferences of domestic consumers, who are the main
constituents of the incumbent government. Studies have shown, for example, that Chi-
nese firms acquiring companies in the U.S. and EU are more likely to face public oppo-
sition than non-Chinese firms (Tingley et al., 2015; Meunier, Burgoon and Jacoby, 2014).
2 In their review article on corporate political activities (CPA), Hillman, Keim and Schuler (2004) suggest
that studies have focused lot on the firm size as the firm-level antecedent of CPA. According to the au-
thors, “[p]erhaps the most prominent of the firm-level antecedents of CPA in recent work is firm size,
whether measured by sales (Bhuyan, 2000; Hansen & Mitchell, 2000; Hart, 2001; Martin, 1995; Schuler,
Rehbein & Cramer, 2002a), assets (Meznar & Nigh, 1995), market share (Schuler, 1996), or number of
employees (Bhuyan, 2000; Hillman, 2003; Meznar & Nigh, 1995). Much of this work continues the tradi-
tion of examining firm size and CPA set by earlier work such as Boddewyn and Brewer (1994), Keim and
Baysinger (1988), and Masters and Keim (1985) who all argue that larger firms are more politically active
and firm size is an important antecedent of particular forms of CPA.” (Hillman, Keim and Schuler (2004),
pp.839-840)
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In addition, a change in the nationality of a large “national champion” firm is particu-
larly concerning if the foreign acquiror is either a state-owned company or from a country
that does not share the host country’s national security interests (Zhang and He, 2014; Li
and Vashchilko, 2010; Bertrand, Betschinger and Settles, 2016). Host governments may
sometimes support the merger of two domestic companies, hoping that the new “national
champion” will be too big to be taken over by foreignMNCs (Serdar Dinc and Erel, 2013).
Using 290 proposed acquisitions screened by European regulators in the 1990s, Aktas,
Bodt and Roll (2007) found that European regulatory intervention on CBM&As increases
when more harm to European rival firms is expected. By examining the cumulative ab-
normal returns, the authors demonstrated that M&A announcements were generally bad
news for the domestic rival firms.3 In such cases, the likelihood of European regulators
intervening in the proposed M&As was higher when the bidder came from outside of the
European Community (EC) than when the bidder is from the EC. Therefore, host gov-
ernments are more protective of domestic industries when CBM&As are a threat to the
existence of domestic rival firms.
Host governments have an array of policies that can be used to restrict FDI, but direct
regulations on CBM&As are most likely to run afoul of investment treaty commitments,
WTO rules, or bilateral trade treaty commitments or to otherwise cause disputes. Thus,
host countries may find it more suitable to use subtler measures. I focus on two such
CBM&A regulations: competition laws and entry restrictions. When assessing an M&A
deal, governments compare the pre-M&A and potential post-M&A conditions in terms of
market share, market concentration, unilateral pricing effect, and product differentiation.
Because these conditions vary across industries andfirms, competition laws are applied on
3 Cumulative abnormal returns is the “sum of the differences between the expected return on a stock
(systematic risk multiplied by the realized market return) and the actual return often used to evalu-
ate the impact of news (such as mergers, interest increase, and lawsuits) on a stock price.” NASDAQ,
https://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/c/cumulative-abnormal-return (access 3.26.2019.)
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a case-by-case basis. This is also truewhen evaluating the national security threat posed by
a CBM&Adeal. Since governments have full authority over and final approval of CBM&A
transactions, other entities may find it difficult to file complaints if an individual CBM&A
deal fails to pass on the grounds that the deal may either harm fair competition or pose a
threat to national security.
4.3.3 Competition Laws and National Security Reviews
Competition Laws and Regulation on CBM&As
Competition laws are the key barriers that both domestic and foreign investors face when
engaging inM&A transactions.4 Since the 1980s, the number of countries that have adopted
competition laws has rapidly increased, and governments have become increasingly ac-
tive in enforcing the law (Büthe, 2015; Yan, 2018). Competition laws concerning M&As
generally regulate those M&A transactions that would potentially decrease market com-
petition to a significant extent. Competition laws regulate economic behaviors that tend
to hinder fair competition, such as curtailing free trade between businesses, predatory
pricing or price gouging, and M&As of large companies. What is concerning is that the
competition laws applied to CBM&As in different industries can disadvantage foreign
investors compared to domestic investors. Existing studies on the effect of competition
laws on CBM&As have demonstrated mixed results. On the one hand, several studies
have concluded that merger laws, particularly those that involve competition laws (Yan,
2018; Conybeare and Kim, 2010; Evenett, 2002; Barattieri, Borchert and Mattoo, 2014), in-
deed decrease CBM&As. On the other hand, other studies have found that competition
laws actually increase CBM&As by resolving informational asymmetry (Bris, Cabolis and
Janowski, 2007; Coeurdacier, De Santis and Aviat, 2009). While detailed (strict) competi-
4 Competition laws are named differently across countries. For example, they are refer to as antitrust laws
in the United States, and anti-monopoly laws in China, Japan, and Korea.
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tion lawsmay provide a fair guide to all potential acquirers, foreign acquirers still stand in
a relatively disadvantaged position compared to domestic acquirers for several reasons.
First, governments strategically use competition laws to protect domestic firms’ com-
petitive advantages over foreign MNCs. Governments are more likely to give exceptions
to domestic firms than to foreign firms when they find violations of competition pol-
icy. Studies on antitrust laws have found that governments promote the business of do-
mestic MNCs at the expense of foreign MNCs (Budzinski, 2012; Evenett, 2002; Guzman,
2004). Therefore, as domestic firms have more influence over their own government’s
policy-making (see section 3.2), the host government’s strategy to increase domestic firms’
global competitiveness further drives discriminatory policy against foreign GUOs regard-
ing CBM&As.
Second, competition laws are more likely to discriminate against CBM&As by foreign
GUOs because foreign acquirers, unlike domestic firms, are not familiar with the legal and
business culture in the local market. Without inside information, foreign firms are unsure
to what extent the strict enforcement of competition laws will affect their CBM&A deals.
Clougherty and Zhang (2021) also argues that domestic merger policies are more likely to
discourage CBM&As than domestic M&As because foreign firms face higher policy risk
and uncertainty due to the inherent liabilities of foreignness and information asymmetry.
The lack of information affects the already high transaction costs that foreign firms have to
pay in order to enter a new local market. Thus, foreign firms become risk-averse to avoid
the large losses that come with failed CBM&As after the deal announcements.
Third, lack of information is also problematic from the host government side. While
the goods and services produced by domestic firms already exist in the local market, the
goods and services of foreign firms are new to the market. As competition laws are en-
forced prior to the completion of M&A transactions, governments have more difficulty in
assessing the economic impact of potential CBM&As by foreign GUOs compared to do-
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mestic GUOs. Although some studies have indicated an increase in firms’ performances
after CBM&As (Ashraf, Herzer and Nunnenkamp, 2016), many others have concluded
that CBM&As have either negative or insignificant effects on the overall local economic
performance (Neto et al., 2008; Wang and SunnyWong, 2009). Therefore, policy enforcers
may be more conservative towards CBM&As that would bring new products to the mar-
ket.
For the empirical analysis, I focus on developed countries (OECD members) to ex-
amine the effect of competition laws on CBM&As in different service industries. I focus
on OECD members because almost all of the CBM&A transactions worldwide are con-
centrated in high-income countries. Furthermore, rather than simply comparing between
CBM&As and domestic M&A activities, I look at the nationality of the GUO of CBM&A
deals to distinguish between domestic parent companies (domestic GUOs) and foreign
parent companies (foreign GUOs). Since competition laws, in theory, should be applied
equally to all M&As, the comparison within CBM&As is pertinent because I am inter-
ested in whether nationality matters in the regulation of CBM&As. To control for the size
of M&A deals, I also examine whether competition laws discourage CBM&As by foreign
GUOs more than CBM&As by domestic GUOs when only examining the top 20% largest
deals. Thus, I test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Stricter competition laws aremore likely to discourage CBM&As
by foreign GUOs compared to CBM&As by domestic GUOs.
National Security Reviews through Entry Restrictions
Another way to regulate CBM&As is by restricting foreign MNCs on the basis of national
security and public order. An increasing number of developed countries are adopting
national security reviews of foreign entries, which is a relatively explicit regulation on
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CBM&As. Since its establishment in 1975, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS) has continued to expand its authority over “covered transactions.”5
Other countries including, European Union member states and Australia, have also re-
cently discussed establishing a CFIUS-like institution to review inward FDI. Although
these measures are supposedly limited to certain industries (e.g., defense, aerospace, and
other sensitive technology or information), the possibility of being disapproved by the
government authority substantially affects CBM&A behaviors.
Most developed countries, and more recently many emerging markets, have laws and
regulations that regulate FDI based on public order and national security concerns. In Ar-
ticle 3 of the OECD “Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements,” member states have
agreed that “the provision of this Code shall not prevent a Member from taking action
which it considers necessary for: i) the maintenance of public order or the protection of
public health, morals and safety; ii) the protection of its essential security interests; iii) the
fulfillment of its obligations relating to international peace and security.”6 Moreover, coun-
tries express reservations regarding liberalizing certain industries according to their own
national situation. This can also be found in the OECD “National Treatment for Foreign-
Controlled Enterprises,” where countries explicitly note measures taken for public order
and security. However, since industries are broadly categorized, it is difficult to identify
which sectors within those industries are considered security sensitive.
How do host governments make decisions about whether a CBM&A is contrary to
national security interests? In most developed countries, there is a government agency
that oversees those transactions. While the details of the reviewing process vary across
5 “CFIUS is an interagency committee authorized to review certain transactions involving foreign invest-
ment in the United States.” CFIUS can unilaterally block cross-border M&As that are considered to be
harmful to national interests.
6 OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements, 2018., p. 10. The Code is updated whenever the
reservations and/or exceptions of an adhering country are modified by the OECD Investment Committee
or the OECD Council. Link to the document (accessed 3/27/2019)
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countries, the U.S. institution is regarded as a good model of reference.7 The U.S. national
security reviews on CBM&As are conducted by the CFIUS, which has recently increased
its profile due to active Chinese M&As in the U.S. The CFIUS is an interagency commit-
tee authorized to review CBM&As that fall under “covered transactions” specified in the
CFIUS regulation, 31 CFR Part 800 and 801. The CFIUS was first established in 1975, and,
since then, it has continuously expanded its role in intervening inCBM&As that trigger na-
tional security concerns. The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018
(FIRRMA)made amendments to the CFIUS, expanding the scope of covered transactions
by broadening the meaning of “critical technology” and increasing the number of days of
the review process from 30-45 days to additional 15 days. Although the main targets of
this law are firms from China, it does not preclude firms from other countries from being
reviewed. Thus, the screening and approval process, in addition to competition laws, is a
major entry barrier to CBM&As.
Moreover, since national security reviews are considered exceptions to economic lib-
eralization treaties, countries are likely to utilize these regulations in industries that de-
mand protection. Since national security reviews only affect CBM&As, comparison be-
tween CBM&As and domestic M&Aswill obviously reveal fewer CBM&As than domestic
M&As. This is a further reason why I compare between CBM&As with foreign GUO and
CBM&As with domestic GUO. A global ultimate owner (or ultimate parent company) is
at the top of the corporate ownership structure, but not necessarily a controlling owner
or beneficiary owner. Even if the GUO is domestic, if the immediate parent is foreign, the
M&A transaction is considered a CBM&A and is “covered” under CFIUS reviews. This
rule is also implied in the CFIUS regulation in Section 800.402 “Contents of voluntary no-
tice,” which states that the transaction notice should include the name and nationality of
7 Many countries, including the European Union members and Australia, have been trying to adopt similar
institutions that resembles that of the US. In fact, Kirchner and Mondschein (2018) argues that the US
CFIUS provides a useful model for how Australia can reform FDI screening process.
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“[t]he immediate parent, the ultimate parent, and each intermediate parent, if any, of the
foreign person that is a party to the transaction.”8 Therefore, if the host government places
a higher priority ondomestic firms, the effect of barriers to screeningwoulddisproportion-
ately discourage CBM&As with foreign GUO. Foreign entry restrictions do not, however,
have distinguishable effects on domestic M&As, regardless of the nationality of the GUO,
because a domestic M&A transaction is not considered an “entry” to the domestic market.
Therefore, I test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Stricter foreign entry restrictions are more likely to discour-
age CBM&As by foreignGUOs compared to CBM&As by domestic GUOs,
even in industries that are not security-sensitive.
4.4 Data and Empirical Analysis
To test each hypothesis, I created a dataset that consists of two types of service-related
regulations and four categories of total number ofM&A transactions. The dataset includes
36 OECDmember states and the data span from 2014 to 2020. Following the service sector
categories of the twomain variables from theOECDServices Trade Restrictiveness Index, I
include 21 service sectors.9 In the following section, I explain each variable in more detail.
8 See 31 CFR Part 800, Department of the Treasury (2008), “Regulations Pertaining toMergers, Acquisitions,
and Takeovers by Foreign Persons; Final Rule.”, p.70724. CFIUS
9 The detail of service sectors is in the Appendix section.
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4.4.1 Data
Dependent Variable: Cross-border M&A deals
I used all M&A deals announced in the past seven years, from 2014 to 2020, obtained from
the SDC Plantinum database.10 I used announced M&As rather than completed M&As
for two reasons. First, I am interested in whether strict regulations discourage the invest-
ment behavior of foreign MNCs so announcement of M&A deals better reflects how the
investment atmosphere affects CBM&As.11 Second, the duration ofM&A deal completion
varies from several months to several years. Thus, the regulatory environment in the year
in which an M&A deal was announced and that of the year when it was completed may
be different. Thus, for consistency, I used the announced dates of M&As.
To identify the GUO (or ultimate parent company), I examined the nationality infor-
mation of the immediate acquirers as well as their ultimate parent companies. In order to
evaluate the effect of government regulations on CBM&As, all M&As deals were sorted
into four different subsets: (1) CBM&As in which the acquirers’ GUOs are foreign, (2)
CBM&As in which the acquirers’ GUOs are domestic, (3) domestic M&As in which the
acquirers’ GUOs are foreign, and (4) domestic M&As in which the acquirers’ GUOs are
domestic. For instance, if both nationalities are different from the target’s nationality, they
are category (1). In this paper, I focus on the comparison between categories (1) and (2).
I counted the number of M&A deals for each country by service sectors (see Appendix).
For hypothesis 2, I divided industries into two subgroups: security-sensitive and non-
10Thompson SDC Platinum database is more widely used because of its accuracy in the firm-level data and
the announcement dates for M&A deals (Bollaert and Delanghe 2015). Another M&As database, Zephyr,
has an edge on the information about vendors andmultiple acquirers; however, my research does not deal
with either of those variables. Therefore, I use SDC Platinum’s M&A data.
11While announced deals have not been formally reviewed by government agencies, announcement itself
brings media attention and can gain informal information on whether a deal has higher possibility of




I examined two types of regulation: barriers to competition (or restrictive competition
law) and foreign entry restrictions (national security review), which are subgroups of the
OECD Service Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI). The STRI measures how open a coun-
try’s market is on scale from zero to one, where one indicates the highest restrictiveness –
completely closed to foreign service providers. This database is suitable for my analysis
for two reasons. First, it contains factual information on laws and regulation based on the
most favored nation (MFN) treatment standard. Therefore, it does not reflect bilateral or
multilateral agreements between and among countries, which makes it easy to focus on
sector-level cross-country comparison. Second, restrictiveness is measured at the sector
level, so it reflects FDI regulation at the industry level. This condition makes it simple to
check if the regulatory restrictiveness of screening and approval for CBM&As is actually
used for national security purposes or for disguised protectionism. There are five policy
areas within the STRI: restrictions on foreign entry, restrictions on the movement of peo-
ple, other discriminatory measures, barriers to competition, and regulatory transparency.
Among these, I utilized two measures that are most relevant to my research on CBM&A
regulations: restrictions on foreign entry and barriers to competition.
The competition laws variable includes laws and regulations applicable to publicly con-
trolled firms, price settings, contract conditions, and vertical and horizontal M&As. While
other policy areas concern discriminatorymeasures against foreign firms, barriers to com-
petition are mostly non-discriminatory, which means that the same laws and regulations
are applied to domestic firms. Therefore, if competition laws have amore discouraging ef-
12For security-sensitive industries, I includeAir transport, Broadcasting, Computer, Maritime transport, Rail
freight transport, Road freight transport, Telecom. All others are labeled as non-sensitive industries.
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fect on CBM&As compared to domestic M&As, the host government is indeed protecting
its domestic firms.
The variable restrictions on foreign entry includes laws and regulations on screening and
approval, nationality of the board of directors, and restrictions onCBM&As. Thus, I found
this measure to be the best representation of CBM&A regulation regarding national secu-
rity reviews. The Appendix provides details on the measurement methods for the two
regulatory restrictiveness indices.
In order to identify the difference between CBM&Aswith foreign GUOs and CBM&As
with domestic GUOs, I used an interaction term for each type of regulatory restrictiveness
variable and a dummy variable for M&A deals by foreign GUOs. For instance, in the type
variable, CBM&As with foreign GUOs are 1, while CBM&As with domestic GUOs are 0.
When comparing domestic M&As by domestic companies whose ultimate parent compa-
nies are foreign and domestic M&As by those whose parent companies are domestic, I
similarly created a dummy for foreign GUOs.13
Control variables
I also included several economic control variables, including the logged value of GDP per
capita, imports and exports as a share of GDP, and outward FDI as a share of GDP to ac-
count for each country’s global economic position.14 I expected that a unit increase in these
variables would be positively associated with the number of CBM&As. I also added two
financial variables that are closely related toM&A activities: exchange rate and share price
index.15 Exchange rate is an important determinant of CBM&As because if the acquirer’s
national currency is stronger than the targeted firm’s national currency, it significantly
13Domestic companies whose GUOs are foreign nationalities are, in other words, foreign affiliates.
14Data onGDPper capitawas downloaded from theWorld BankDataBank and import, export, and outward
FDI data were obtained from OECD.Stat database.
15Both data were obtained from OECD.Stat database.
93
reduces the cost of a M&A. A share price index, or stock price, is particularly important
for CBM&As because it represents the average prices of company shares within a coun-
try. Thus, the lower the price, the higher the number of M&A deals, because targeted
firms become more affordable to the acquirers. Finally, I included two variables related
to FDI openness: start-up procedures to register a business and the number of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs).16 As the procedures to start a business increase, the number of
CBM&As compared to domestic M&As should decrease. In contrast, the number of BITs
should be positively associated with the number of CBM&As.
4.4.2 Empirical Model
I used panel ordinary least square (OLS) model with country-industry and year fixed
effects to test hypotheses. The equation below specifies the two empirical methods. i,
j, t, and k denote industry, country, year, and the type of CBM&A, respectively. X1ijt is
the regulatory restrictiveness index value of either the competition law or foreign entry
restriction, X2k is the type of GUO (1 if foreign GUO and 0 if domestic GUO) and (X1 ∗
X2)ijtk is the interaction term of the two. Ujt represents country-level control variables.
yijtk = α + β1X1ijt + β2X2k + β3(X1 ∗X2)ijtk + γUjt + εijtk
4.4.3 Results
Table 4.1 presents the results for hypothesis 1 examining the effect of competition laws on
CBM&As by foreign GUOs and domestic GUOs. Looking at model (1), a unit increase
in the restrictiveness of competition laws increase the number of CBM&As by 21.71 deals
when the CBM&A acquirer’s GUO is domestic. However, the effect of competition laws
16Start-up procedures downloaded from the World Bank DataBank and BITs downloaded from UNCTAD
(https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements).
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on the number of CBM&A deals is lowered by 40.55 when the acquirer’s GUO is foreign,
turning the slope negative (-18.84). Figure 4.2 graphically illustrates themarginal effects of
competition laws on the number of two types of CBM&As. While the number of CBM&As
led by domestic GUO increase with stricter competition laws, the slope for foreign GUO
decreases as the restrictiveness of competition laws increase. In other words, CBM&As
led by foreign GUOs are significantly discouraged with stricter competition laws. The
results are consistent when important control variables are included in model (2). Thus,
hypothesis 1 is supported in the empirical analysis. Strict competition laws tend to dispro-
portionately discourage CBM&Adeals with acquirers whose GUOs are foreign compared
to CBM&A deals with acquirers whose GUOs are domestic.
Models (3) and (4) present the results on the effect of competition laws on large-scale
CBM&A deals to examine if hypothesis 1 holds for large deals. This examination is im-
portant because CBM&As tend to be larger than domestic M&As and thus are more likely
to be regulated by competition laws. While the effect of competition law alone does not
show statistical significance, the difference between the slope of the effect of competition
laws on CBM&As by foreign GUOs and that on CBM&As by domestic firms is negative
and significant. Within the subset of the top 20% of the largest deals, competition laws
discourage CBM&As by foreign GUOs by 0.957. In other words, discrimination against
CBM&As is not due to the fact that CBM&A deals are larger than domestic M&As. There-
fore, there is evidence that the nationality of the GUOs of foreign MNCs matters when
governments enact and enforce competition laws on CBM&As.
Table 4.2 presents the regression results for hypothesis 2. Models, (1) and (2) include
all industries, while models (3) and (4) are subsets of security-sensitive industries and
others, respectively. As with the results from Table 4.1, strict entry restrictions are more
likely to discourage CBM&A deals by acquirers whose GUOs are foreign compared to
CBM&A deals by acquirers whose GUOs are domestic. The results are statistically sig-
95
Table 4.1: Effect of Competition Laws
All CBM&As Top 20% CBM&As
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Competition Law 21.71∗∗∗ 23.29∗∗∗ 0.565 0.859
(5.997) (6.523) (0.562) (0.672)
Foreign GUO 4.53∗∗∗ 4.59∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗
(0.250) (0.277) (0.023) (0.029)
Competition Law:Foreign GUO −40.55∗∗∗ −40.79∗∗∗ −1.522∗∗∗ −1.927∗∗∗
(5.545) (6.079) (0.520) (0.627)
Logged GDPPC −0.926 0.056
(2.502) (0.258)
∆ Exchange Rate 1.045 0.218
(2.931) (0.302)




Business Procedure 0.123 0.011
(0.257) (0.027)
Export (% of GDP) −0.019 −0.010
(0.107) (0.011)
Import (% of GDP) −0.003 0.009
(0.114) (0.012)
Number of BITs −0.159 −0.020
(0.240) (0.025)
Observations 10,990 8,804 10,990 8,804
R2 0.222 0.225 0.192 0.222
Adjusted R2 0.217 0.218 0.187 0.215
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y
Note: C=country, I=industry, Y=year ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
96
Figure 4.2: Marginal Effects of Competition Law
nificant throughout all models for all industries, security-sensitive industries and non-
sensitive industries. Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 graphically depict the marginal effects of
foreign entry restrictions on CBM&As. Looking at Figures 4.3 and 4.4, while stricter for-
eign entry restrictions have positive effect on the number of CBM&As led by domestic
GUOs, they have negative effect on the number of CBM&As led by foreign GUOs. These
results confirms that foreign entry restrictions definitely discourage CBM&As led by for-
eign GUOs. This make sense because CBM&As led by foreign GUOsmay indeed threaten
national security and public order. However, this pattern persists even when the indus-
tries are subset to security non-sensitive sectors. In Figure 4.5, which only includes security
non-sensitive industries, strict foreign entry restrictions discourage CBM&As by foreign
GUOs, while CBM&As by domestic GUOs are increasing. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is also
supported in the empirical analysis. Strict entry restrictions discourage CBM&A deals by
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foreign GUOs to a much greater extent than deals by domestic GUOs, and the pattern is
not limited to security-sensitive industries. These results indicate that national security
reviews are potentially used as a way to protect domestic industries from foreign acquir-
ers.
Figure 4.3: Marginal Effects of Foreign Entry Restriction
Table 4.3 presents the effect of entry restrictions on large-scale CBM&As (top 20%
largest deals). Similar to the results from Table 4.2, strict entry restrictions are associ-
ated with a larger decrease in CBM&As by acquirers whose GUOs are foreign compared
to CBM&As by acquirers whose GUOs are domestic. However, when industries are di-
vided into security sensitive and non-sensitive, entry restrictions do not show statistical
significance. The results in models (3) and (4) indicate that foreign entry restrictions
discriminate against foreign firms, but not in non-sensitive industries. In other words,
among large-scale M&A transactions, entry restrictions may actually discriminate against
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Table 4.2: Effect of Entry Restriction (All CBM&As)
All Cross-border M&As
All industries Security Non-Security
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entry Restriction 8.412∗∗∗ 8.795∗∗∗ 15.231∗∗ 5.732∗∗∗
(2.308) (2.505) (6.478) (1.636)
Foreign GUO 4.845∗∗∗ 4.945∗∗∗ 10.496∗∗∗ 3.010∗∗∗
(0.284) (0.314) (0.986) (0.183)
Entry Restriction:Foreign GUO −18.219∗∗∗ −18.635∗∗∗ −44.410∗∗∗ −7.528∗∗∗
(2.528) (2.760) (6.652) (1.941)
Logged GDPPC −0.926 −1.196 −0.818
(2.502) (7.282) (1.444)
∆ Exchange Rate 1.059 2.271 0.503
(2.931) (8.513) (1.693)
∆ Shared Price −0.275 −0.416 −0.210
(1.245) (3.633) (0.718)
OFDI 0.005 0.006 0.004
(0.017) (0.050) (0.009)
Business Procedure 0.118 0.081 0.129
(0.257) (0.745) (0.149)
Export (% of GDP) −0.018 −0.036 −0.010
(0.107) (0.311) (0.062)
Import (% of GDP) −0.004 0.012 −0.011
(0.114) (0.334) (0.066)
Number of BITs −0.159 −0.237 −0.123
(0.240) (0.695) (0.139)
Observations 10,990 8,804 2,744 6,060
R2 0.222 0.225 0.227 0.330
Adjusted R2 0.217 0.218 0.211 0.323
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y
Note: C=country, I=industry, Y=year ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 4.4: Marginal Effects of Foreign Entry Restriction (Security-Sensitive)
Figure 4.5: Marginal Effects of Foreign Entry Restriction (Non-Sensitive)
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Table 4.3: Effect of Entry Restriction (Top 20% Deals)
Top 20% CBM&As
All industries Security Non-Security
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entry Restriction 0.339 0.432∗ −0.163 0.794∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.258) (0.565) (0.270)
Foreign GUO 0.227∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.032) (0.086) (0.030)
Entry Restriction:Foreign GUO −0.698∗∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −2.219∗∗∗ −0.326
(0.237) (0.285) (0.580) (0.320)
Logged GDPPC 0.056 0.441 −0.126
(0.258) (0.635) (0.238)
∆ Exchange Rate 0.218 0.229 0.208
(0.302) (0.742) (0.280)
∆ Shared Price 0.022 0.078 −0.003
(0.128) (0.317) (0.119)
OFDI 0.0001 −0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Business Procedure 0.011 −0.033 0.031
(0.027) (0.065) (0.025)
Export (% of GDP) −0.010 0.0002 −0.015
(0.011) (0.027) (0.010)
Import (% of GDP) 0.009 0.002 0.012
(0.012) (0.029) (0.011)
Number of BITs −0.020 −0.029 −0.015
(0.025) (0.061) (0.023)
Observations 10,990 8,804 2,744 6,060
R2 0.192 0.222 0.211 0.263
Adjusted R2 0.187 0.215 0.194 0.256
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y
Note: C=country, I=industry, Y=year ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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foreign firms on the grounds of national security. Therefore, while both competition laws
and national security reviews clearly discriminate against foreignMNCs and favor domes-
tic MNCs in CBM&As, entry restrictions in large-scale CBM&As may only be applied in
security-sensitive industries.
Finally, looking at the control variables, while the signs mostly indicate expected re-
sults, none of the results are statistically significant. First, an increase in the exchange
rates of target companies’ domestic currencies is associated with more M&A deals, which
means that large amounts of M&As may have an effect on the increase of currency value.
An increase in shared prices, however, is generally associated with fewer M&As, indicat-
ing that the more expensive the target companies become, the fewer M&A deals result.
Outward FDI is associated with more M&A deals, which means that countries that en-
gage in active outward FDI are also likely to have significant inward FDI. Finally, exports
and imports have negative correlations with the number of CBM&As, which means that
FDI often serves as an alternative to international trade.
Several indicators exhibited unexpected results. For instance, GDP per capita is neg-
atively associated with the number of M&As, and the number of start-up procedures is
positively associated with both cross-border and domestic M&As. Finally, the number
of BITs also did not exhibit consistent results, but this result may be because BITs do not
matter much in high-income countries and domestic M&A deals.
4.5 Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, I investigated whether FDI host governments discriminate against foreign
firms and favor domestic firms by examining the regulatory restrictiveness of CBM&As
in service sectors and how these regulations are applied differently when the acquirers’
parent companies are foreign versus domestic. I demonstrated that competition laws and
102
national security reviews are more likely to discriminate against CBM&As led by foreign
GUOs compared to domestic GUOs. These findings reveal that governments favor domes-
tic MNCs over foreign MNCs when enforcing merger laws. Restrictive competition laws
are more likely to deter the CBM&A activities of foreign firms whose GUOs are also for-
eign, compared to the CBM&A activities of foreign firms whose GUOs are domestic. Na-
tional security reviews, which are enacted through entry restrictions, also deter CBM&As
by acquirers with foreign GUOs more than CBM&As by acquirers with domestic GUOs,
even in industries that are not considered security sensitive. Thus, governments efficiently
use competition laws and national security reviews to protect domestic firms from com-
petition with foreign MNCs.
This paper contributes to the literature on the politics of FDI in IPE by focusing on a rel-
atively understudied topic. By exploring competition laws and national security reviews,
I detail host governments’ subtle way of discriminating against CBM&As. Moreover, this
paper emphasizes the importance of the nationality of global parent companies by dis-
aggregating CBM&As into domestic and foreign GUOs, rather than simply comparing
CBM&As to domestic M&As. When comparing CBM&As to domestic M&As, it is im-
portant to identify the ultimate parent companies that are involved in the transactions.
Furthermore, the population sample of this paper is not limited to a single country or a
single industry. By including 36 countries and 21 service sectors, I reveal that the dis-
criminatory behavior of host governments toward CBM&As led by foreign MNCs can be
observed across countries and industries.
This study, however, uses an aggregate number of M&A deals for each country, and
thus lacks country pairwise specific characteristics. For instance, geographic distance,
common language, common legal system, and other forms of cultural familiarity mat-
ter to CBM&As decisions. Moreover, when it comes to regulatory restrictiveness, bilateral
agreements such as investment treaties or free trade agreements often include informa-
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tion on how to cooperate when confronting different competition laws. More importantly,
there are agreements that directly address cooperation in competition laws. For instance,
the U.S. has signed antitrust cooperation agreements with multiple countries to better en-
force antitrust laws. In addition, the OECD Competition Committee has put together an
inventory of international cooperation agreements where at least one of the signatories is
anOECD country. Therefore, in future research, an empirical analysis using directed dyad





The intensifying global competition for high-tech leadership and rising security tensions
between the United States and China have caused regulation on inward FDI and discrim-
ination against foreign MNCs to become more apparent in many high-income countries.
Although the majority of the attention is directed toward Chinese companies, activities
of all foreign MNCs fall under governmental FDI regulation policies. The regulatory re-
strictiveness of these policies, however, varies across industries within each country. I
posit that the variation is mainly due to industry features and MNC market entry modes
that have substantial impact on the local market competition. Anticipating the intensify-
ing competition, domestic producers seek protection from foreign rivals that are entering
the market. Since domestic producers have more influence over their own government’s
policymaking, FDI regulation policies reflect the inward FDI preferences of domestic pro-
ducers. In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I provided evidence for this theory.
In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that the extent of IEoS and EEoSwithin industries shapes
the level of FDI restrictions that those industries secure. By developing a formal model
of the endogenous FDI regulations, I posit that the extent of IEoS leads to an increase
in the restrictiveness of FDI regulations, while the extent of EEoS leads to a decrease in
the restrictiveness of FDI regulations. By examining the FDI regulatory restrictiveness of
36 OECD countries, I have found support for both patterns. Therefore, I proposed that
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industry features are significant factors in understanding the variation in FDI regulations
across industries.
In the following chapter, I focused on the effect of FDI entry modes on FDI regulatory
restrictiveness levels. The findings indicated that in industries with many greenfield in-
vestment projects, FDI regulatory restrictiveness is higher than in industries with many
CBM&As. The results indicate that domestic producers are relatively more favorable to
CBM&As than to greenfield investments because the latter FDI entry mode tends to in-
crease market competition more directly. Therefore, FDI market entry modes, in addition
to industry features, are fundamental in understanding why variation exists in FDI regu-
lations across industries.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I demonstrated that domestic producers want protection from
international competition and that governments actively utilize policy tools to protect
domestic producers from foreign MNCs entering the local market. By examining two
types of policies that govern M&As, I illustrated that competition laws and national secu-
rity reviews discourage CBM&A deals led by foreign global parent companies more than
CBM&A deals led by domestic global parent companies. Therefore, I posited that govern-
ments in high-income countries employ subtle measures to protect domestic producers
from foreign MNCs.
This research on FDI regulations has important implications for both academia and
real-world politics. I offer the field of IPE a new theoretical framework to explain why
governments place varying degrees of barriers on inward FDIs across industries. I utilized
two crucial factors that shape domestic producers’ preferences regarding inward FDIs by
altering the market competition. First, I proved that industry features defined by IEoS and
EEoS change the extent of market competition, which causes domestic producers to be
wary of new entries by foreign MNCs in industries where competition may increase. Sec-
ond, I presented how two types of FDI market entry modes – greenfield investments and
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CBM&As – alter themarket competition and shape the FDI policy preferences of domestic
producers. By emphasizing industry features and FDI market entry modes, I highlighted
the topics that have made limited progress in IPE literature.
The findings in this dissertation also offer important policy implications for the real
world. I established that developed countries, as a reaction to globalization, utilize subtle
protectionist policies to defend domestic producers’ interests. Notably, this protectionism
is occurring in domains other than trade or offshoring, which are frequently addressed
by researchers and policy practitioners. With the rise of economic nationalism and global
competition for high-tech leadership, governmental discrimination against foreignMNCs
by imposing regulations on inward FDIs is likely to increase in the near future. Such pro-
tectionist measures, in the short term, may enable domestic producers to gain competi-
tiveness in the global market, although prolonged protectionism may eventually lead to
the opposite result. Without fair competition between domestic firms and foreign MNCs,
there is no reason to invest in R&D for technological improvements. Consequently, those
whowill suffer fromFDI protectionismare not only consumerswhowould pay high prices
for low-quality goods and services but also the entire global economy, which would ex-
perience stagnant economic growth. Therefore, this study on FDI regulations posits that
policy practitioners must be cautious when taking the side of domestic producers.
Future research on FDI regulations should include the missing parts of foreignMNCs’
activities in local markets. For instance, there may be inter-industry activities by foreign
MNCs that would change the preferences of domestic producers regarding inward FDI.
This is particularly significant when considering how vertical FDIs have substantially de-
creased the cost of production for foreign MNCs although they do not necessary com-
pete with domestic producers in local markets. This is because vertical FDIs are typically
export-oriented, unlike horizontal FDIs, which are market-oriented. Thus, the research
on FDI regulations should distinguish between industries that are more likely to attract
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vertical FDI and those that are more likely to attract horizontal FDI. Nevertheless, vertical
FDI is more common in developing countries than in developed countries, which are the
focus in this dissertation. Thus, for future research, it may be interesting to investigate
which industry features, other than economies of scale, shape the preferences of domestic
producers in developing countries. Moreover, CBM&As are not yet active in develop-
ing countries, although as economies develop, more foreign MNCs will enter markets in
developing countries via CBM&As. It would then be important to examine whether do-
mestic producers in developing and emerging markets prefer one type of FDI entry mode
over another.
Finally, there is more to explore on the topic of CBM&As, which has been largely
neglected in the field of IPE. Growing numbers of global CBM&A activities raise ques-
tions about whether systematic international cooperation on M&A laws is needed; this
has historically belonged to the realm of domestic politics. However, because M&A laws
are strictly domestic, they increase the risk and uncertainty in CBM&A deals led by for-
eign MNCs. Therefore, it is important to further examine whether M&A laws are applied
equally to all M&A transactions, regardless of participants’ nationalities. If discrimina-
tion is present, then studies should investigate the drivers of the discrepancies between




Figure 6.1: FDI Restrictiveness By Country
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Figure 6.2: FDI Restrictiveness Index By Industry Within Each Country
5.2 Solving for Equilibrium Profits
5.2.1 Cournot Triopoly in an IEoS Industry
Equilibrium outputs for domestic and foreign firms are solved by maximizing equations
(4) and (5) in terms of qd1, qd2, and qf , respectively. This yields the following equilibrium
quantity function for q∗d1:
q∗d1 =
(2β + γ − θ)− αγ










Due to mathematical complexity, I use numerical values for certain parameters (α = 1,
β = 1, γ = 0.5, and c = 1) to express the following equilibrium output for each firm1:
q∗d1 = −
τ + 2(τ − 1)(θ − 2)− 1
(θ − 2)( 1













= A, the following expression for q∗f is obtained:
1 All numerical solutions were done in Matlab
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q∗f = 4(θ − 2)
{
0.5A− τ + τ + 2(τ − 1)(θ − 2)− 1
2(θ − 2)(2θ + 1




By setting 0.5A− τ + τ+2(τ−1)(θ−2)−1
2(θ−2)(2θ+ 1
2θ−4−2)+1
+1 = B, q∗d2 is simplified in the following equation:
q∗d2 = −
A− 2(θ − 2)B
θ − 2
(5.4)
Next, equations (12)–(14) are each plugged into the following price function to obtain
the equilibrium price for each firm:
p∗i∈(d1,d2,f) = α− βq∗i∈(d1,d2,f) − γ(q∗j 6=i + q∗k 6=i,j) (5.5)
Finally, the equilibrium profits of domestic and foreign firms can be obtained by solving























5.2.2 Cournot Triopoly in an EEoS Industry
Equilibrium outputs for domestic and foreign firms under EEoS industry are solved by
maximizing equations (6) and (7) in terms of qd1, qd2, and qf , respectively. This yields the
following equilibrium quantity function for q∗d1 under EEoS2:
q∗d1 =
(2β + (γ − η)− θ)− α(γ − η)





(γ − η)− θ)(γ − η)c




2 Notice that the only term that changes is γ, which is now subtracted by the degree of EEoS, or η.
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Due to the complexity of the calculation, I use numerical values α = 1, β = 1, γ = 0.5, θ =
0, and c = 1 to solve the equilibrium output of each firm.
q∗d1 =
0.5− 0.5τ − η(τ − 1)
0.25− η3 − 9/17η2 + 4/17η
(5.9)
Equilibrium functions of q∗f and q∗d2 closely resembles that of q∗d1:
q∗f =
τ − 0.25q∗d1 + η2q∗d1 − 1
(η − 0.5)2
(5.10)
q∗d2 = (0.5− η)
(
q∗d1 −




By replacing equations (16) and (17) to the inverse demand functions of domestic and
foreign firms, I obtain the equilibrium price for each firm: p∗di and p∗f . The calculation
process to solve the equilibrium profit for each firm (π∗di and π∗f) is exactly the same as
that of the Cournot triopoly under IEoS.
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5.3 Description of the U.S. Census Bureau Data
1. OECDCountries (36): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the CzechRepub-
lic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Por-
tugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
2. Industries (21): Manufacturing, engineering, electricity generation, electricity dis-
tribution, wholesale, retail, hotels and restaurants, air transportation, water trans-
portation, land transportation, mobile telecommunications, fixed telecommunica-
tions, radio and TV broadcasting, newspapers and print media, banking, insurance,
other financial services, accounting and audit services, architectural services, legal
services, and real estate
3. Summary Statistics
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics - U.S. Census Bureau Data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
FDI Index 756 0.093 0.182 0.000 0.000 0.110 1.000
Industry Conc 756 0.450 0.258 0.088 0.203 0.604 0.975
Geographic Conc 756 0.163 0.053 0.098 0.129 0.207 0.294
large_4 756 23.587 20.832 2.600 7.900 29.900 89.100
large_8 756 32.901 23.886 4.500 12.600 41.400 95.200
large_20 756 44.951 25.827 8.800 20.300 60.400 97.500
large_50 756 55.899 26.501 16.500 28.000 81.900 98.800
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5.4 Description of the OECD Data
1. Countries (36): Same as 5.3
2. Industries in Enterprise Birth Rate Data (11): Mining and Quarrying, Manufactur-
ing, Electricity, Construction, Distribution, Hotels and Restaurants, Telecommunica-
tion, Transportation, Financial Services, Business Service, and Real Estate.
3. Industries inR&DExpensesData (18): Primary (Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing),
Mining andQuarrying, Food and othermanufacturing, Oil andChemicalsmanufac-
turing, Metals and non-metals manufacturing, Transportation Equipment, Electron-
ics and Machinery, Construction, Electricity, Distribution, Hotels and Restaurants,
Transportation, Telecommunications, Radio and TV broadcasting, Other Media, Fi-
nancial Services, Business Services, and Real Estate
4. Summary Statistics
Table 6.2: Summary Statistics - OECD Data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Year 7,131 2,013.400 2.172 2,010 2,011 2,015 2,017
R&D 3,369 65,027.810 945,415.100 0.000 12.408 926.800 30,444,869.000
EBR 2,797 10.508 5.929 0.000 7.100 12.700 72.500
EDR 2,797 10.261 5.791 0.000 7.000 12.400 72.500
EBR Net 2,797 0.247 1.875 −6.900 0.000 0.000 38.100
FDI Index 2,670 0.069 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.079 1.000
GDPPC (log) 2,937 10.423 0.589 9.301 9.891 10.836 11.685
GDP Growth 2,937 2.381 2.786 −4.028 1.255 3.318 25.163
Pop (15-64) 2,937 66.359 2.486 60.076 64.985 67.591 73.414
Imports 2,937 53.405 30.781 13.576 30.853 71.989 191.549
OFDI 2,937 3.515 9.480 −21.765 0.280 3.190 57.837
Security 2,937 0.182 0.386 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
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5.5 Description of the Orbis Data
1. Countries (36): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mex-
ico, Netherlands, Norway, NewZealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
2. Industries (28): Agriculture, Forestry, Fishieries, Mining and Quarrying, Food and
othermanufacturing, Oil andChemicalsmanufacturing,Metals andnon-metalsman-
ufacturing, TransportationEquipment, Electronics andMachinery, Construction, Elec-
tricity,Wholesale, Retail, Hotels andRestaurants, Air transportation,Maritime trans-
portation, Surface transportation, Telecommunications, Radio and TV broadcasting,
Other Media, Banking, Insurance, Other Financial Services, Accounting and Audit
services, Architectural services, Legal services, Engineering services, and Real Estate
3. Summary Statistics
Table 6.3: Summary Statistics - Orbis Firm-level Data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
fdi_index 4,760 0.085 0.172 0.000 0.000 0.100 1.000
year 5,008 2,013.500 2.292 2,010 2,011.8 2,015.2 2,017
sh_fc1 4,666 0.569 0.184 0.00000 0.446 0.705 1.000
lintangible 4,838 10.594 4.183 −6.908 9.283 13.152 17.025
lgdppc 4,760 10.464 0.593 9.076 10.052 10.851 11.685
growth 4,760 2.213 2.555 −9.132 1.333 3.063 25.163
pop_1564 4,760 66.191 2.564 60.076 64.847 67.382 73.414
sh_imp 4,760 43.519 27.205 13.576 28.578 48.718 191.549
sh_ofdi 4,760 3.201 7.448 −21.765 0.470 3.336 57.837
security 5,008 0.158 0.365 0 0 0 1
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5.6 Top 10 Industries for Each Type of FDI
The following two tables display the top 10 industries with most greenfield projects and
cross-border M&As in OECD countries from 2003 to 2019.3 Industries with most global
greenfield projects and that of cross-borderM&As transactions are different. While green-
field projects are most frequent in engineering, transport equipment manufacturing, and
retail, cross-border M&A deals are most frequent in agriculture mining and quarrying,
and food and othermanufacturing industries. The only industries that are both commonly
frequent in both greenfield investments and M&As are electric, electronics and other in-
struments manufacturing, real estate investment, and metals, machinery, and other min-
erals manufacturing industries.
Table 6.4: Top 10 Industries in Greenfield Projects (OECD)2003-2019
Top 10 Industries in Greenfield Projects (OECD)2003-2019
Industry No. of Projects (% of Total)
Engineering 26,160 (15.1%)
Transport Equipment Manufacturing 12,452 (7.2%)
Retail 11,296 (6.5%)
Banking 10,274 (6.0%)
Electric, Electronics and Other Instruments 8,125 (4.9%)
Real Estate Investment 6,271 (3.6%)
Other Media 5,778 (3.3%)
Hotels and Restaurants 5,593 (3.2%)
Food and Other Manufacturing 5,411 (3.1%)
Metals, Machinery, and Other Minerals Manufacturing 4,433 (2.6%)
3 Number of greenfield projects are gathered from fDi Market database. For consistent categorization of
industries, I re-categorized the industries by referring to the information on subsectors and industry ac-
tivities. Industries are then matched to the OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index data. Total number of M&A
deals are gathered from Thomson SDC Platinum database. For SDC data, industries are re-categorized
based on the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.
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Table 6.5: Top 10 Industries in Cross-border M&A Deals (OECD) 2003-2019
Top 10 Industries in Cross-border M&A Deals (OECD) 2003-2019
Industry No. of Deals (% of Total)
Agriculture 27,789 (20.4%)
Mining and Quarrying 10,304 (7.6%)
Food and Other 9,652 (7.0%)
Metals, machinery and other minerals 8,844 (6.5%)
Forestry 8,789 (6.5%)
Electric, Electronics and other instruments 8,619 (6.3%)
Real Estate Investment 8,437 (6.2%)
Oil ref. and Chemicals 8,395 (6.2%)
Other finance 6,582 (4.8%)
Wholesale 5,847 (4.3%)
5.7 Data Description for FDI Entry Modes
1. OECD Countries (36): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ice-
land, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
2. Industries (28): Agriculture, Forestry, Fishieries, Mining and Quarrying, Food and
othermanufacturing, Oil andChemicalsmanufacturing,Metals andnon-metalsman-
ufacturing, TransportationEquipment, Electronics andMachinery, Construction, Elec-
tricity,Wholesale, Retail, Hotels andRestaurants, Air transportation,Maritime trans-
portation, Surface transportation, Telecommunications, Radio and TV broadcasting,
Other Media, Banking, Insurance, Other Financial Services, Accounting and Audit




Table 6.6: Summary Statistics - FDI Entry Modes
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Year 14,364 2,012.520 5.792 1,997 2,010 2,017 2,019
FDI Index 14,364 0.123 0.196 0.000 0.000 0.167 1.000
GF Total 14,364 10.016 54.430 0 0 5 1,738
M&A Total 14,364 37.969 157.085 0 1 22 5,283
R&D 5,717 1,671.113 7,946.219 0.000 3.601 383.859 114,468.400
lag.R&D 5,126 1,642.152 7,813.901 0.000 3.557 378.377 114,468.400
Share of GF 14,364 0.180 0.276 0 0 0.3 1
Share of M&A 14,364 0.616 0.407 0 0.1 1 1
OECD 14,364 0.583 0.493 0 0 1 1
EMPN 2,482 393,548.200 737,125.400 99.000 32,040.250 359,944.800 6,632,960.000
VAFC 1,152 92,373.500 281,395.400 231.600 4,255.350 83,244.070 4,001,530.000
CFCC 4,412 647,166.200 3,667,346.000 2.700 402.828 15,174.500 70,555,485.000
LABR 5,015 1,155,439.000 5,971,376.000 13.900 1,073.466 53,057.500 84,691,500.000
OTXS 4,850 102,248.800 818,676.900 −6,067,552.000 −3.000 1,507.850 15,932,043.000
5.8 Using the Sum of Values of FDI Projects/Deals
Table 6.7: Total Value of FDI and FDI Restrictiveness
Dependent variable: FDI Restrictiveness
Reduced Form 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of Greenfield 0.003
(0.004)
Share of M&A −0.006∗
(0.003)
Share of Greenfield′ 0.422∗∗∗
(0.078)
Share of M&A′ −0.545∗∗∗
(0.100)
Observations 13,950 13,950 4,866 4,866
R2 0.406 0.406 0.461 0.461
Adjusted R2 0.402 0.402 0.454 0.454
Residual Std. Error 0.138 (df = 13872) 0.138 (df = 13872) 0.089 (df = 4805) 0.089 (df = 4805)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 6.8: Total Value of FDI and FDI Restrictiveness (with Controls)
Dependent variable: FDI Restrictiveness
Reduced Form 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of Greenfield 0.018∗∗∗
(0.005)
Share of M&A 0.011∗∗
(0.005)
Share of Greenfield′ 0.333∗∗∗
(0.081)
Share of M&A′ −0.406∗∗∗
(0.099)
log.LABR 0.062∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
log.EMPN −0.008 −0.008 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
log.VAFC −0.043∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
log.CFCC −0.009∗ −0.007 0.008∗ 0.008∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
OTXS −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 4,350 4,350 3,385 3,385
R2 0.361 0.362 0.399 0.399
Adjusted R2 0.352 0.354 0.389 0.389
Residual Std. Error 0.098 (df = 4292) 0.098 (df = 4292) 0.080 (df = 3329) 0.080 (df = 3329)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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5.9 Different Types of FDI Restrictiveness
Figure 6.3: FDI Entry Modes and Other Types of Restrictions
5.10 Data Description for Disguised Protectionism
1. Industry (21): logistics cargo-handling, logistics storage and warehouse, logistics
freight forwarding, logistics customs brokerage, accounting, architecture, engineer-
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ing, legal, motion pictures, broadcasting, telecommunication, air transportation, wa-
ter transportation, road freight transport, rail freight transport, courier, distribution,
commercial banking, insurance, computer, construction
2. Summary Statistics
Table 6.9: Summary Statistics - Disguised Protectionism
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Year 14,686 2,017.000 2.000 2,014 2,015 2,019 2,020
Competition Law 14,686 0.036 0.045 0 0.01 0.04 0
Entry Res 14,686 0.105 0.092 0.000 0.043 0.131 0.542
M&A 14,686 1.795 9.755 0 0 1 373
Foreign GUO 14,686 0.500 0.500 0 0 1 1
Log GDPPC 12,588 10.016 0.900 7.361 9.334 10.744 11.685
Share Export 12,500 48.529 33.970 11.000 28.500 65.200 221.200
Share Import 12,500 45.031 28.651 11.800 27.200 57.800 187.200
Business Procedure 12,588 5.940 2.619 1.000 4.000 8.000 15.000
Change Exchange 13,718 0.042 0.089 −0.130 −0.020 0.071 0.588
Change Shared Price 12,838 0.047 0.119 −0.356 −0.025 0.119 0.657
OFDI 13,146 3.201 13.285 −17.298 0.340 2.610 173.061
bits 14,070 18.385 8.498 1.000 12.000 26.000 34.000
OECD 14,686 0.748 0.434 0 0 1 1
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5.11 Scoring Method for Regulatory Restrictiveness
1. Restrictions on Foreign Entry
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2. Restrictions on Foreign Entry Example: Distribution Industry
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3. Barriers to Competition Example: Distribution Industry
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5.12 Other Results from Chapter 4
125
Table 6.10: M&As by Foreign Affiliate vs. M&As by Domestic Firms
Cross-border M&As Domestic M&As
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Competition law:Foreign affiliate −30.732∗∗∗ −30.380∗∗∗ 162.891∗∗∗ 164.261∗∗∗
(5.579) (6.118) (29.906) (32.356)
Competition law 19.948∗∗∗ 21.261∗∗∗ −140.496∗∗∗ −133.296∗∗∗
(6.033) (6.564) (32.339) (34.715)
Foreign affiliate 3.102∗∗∗ 3.097∗∗∗ −17.540∗∗∗ −17.867∗∗∗
(0.252) (0.279) (1.350) (1.475)
Logged GDPPC −1.825 −2.248
(2.518) (13.317)
∆ Exchange rate 2.143 6.630
(2.950) (15.601)




Business Procedure 0.142 0.379
(0.259) (1.369)
Export (% of GDP) −0.002 0.158
(0.108) (0.570)
Import (% of GDP) −0.032 −0.304
(0.115) (0.609)
Number of BITs −0.231 0.486
(0.241) (1.276)
Observations 10,990 8,804 10,990 8,804
R2 0.288 0.293 0.156 0.163
Adjusted R2 0.284 0.288 0.151 0.156
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y
Note: C=country, I=industry, Y=year ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 6.11: Cross-border M&As by Foreign GUOs vs. Domestic M&As by Foreign GUOs
M&As (by Foreign GUOs)
All industries Security Non-Security
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entry Restriction:Foreign Affiliate −13.150∗∗∗ −13.163∗∗∗ −35.309∗∗∗ −4.990∗∗∗
(2.543) (2.778) (6.089) (1.819)
Entry Restriction 6.583∗∗∗ 6.812∗∗∗ 8.396 6.557∗∗∗
(2.322) (2.521) (5.975) (1.542)
Foreign Affiliate 3.287∗∗∗ 3.301∗∗∗ 8.257∗∗∗ 1.621∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.317) (0.889) (0.169)
Logged GDPPC −1.809
(2.519)
∆ Exchange Rate 2.174
(2.950)






Export (% of GDP) 0.001
(0.108)
Import (% of GDP) −0.034
(0.115)
Number of BITs −0.235
(0.241)
Observations 10,990 8,804 3,430 7,560
R2 0.288 0.293 0.272 0.438
Adjusted R2 0.283 0.288 0.262 0.434
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y
Note: C=country, I=industry, Y=year ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 6.12: Domestic M&As by Foreign GUOs vs. Domestic M&As by Domestic GUOs
Domestic M&As
All industries Security Non-Security
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entry Restriction:Foreign Affiliate 64.391∗∗∗ 65.393∗∗∗ 146.531∗∗∗ 13.134
(13.638) (14.697) (29.132) (14.288)
Entry Restriction −35.209∗∗∗ −33.713∗∗ −132.611∗∗∗ 21.174∗
(12.453) (13.338) (28.588) (12.115)
Foreign Affiliate −18.070∗∗∗ −18.475∗∗∗ −32.789∗∗∗ −12.078∗∗∗
(1.532) (1.674) (4.253) (1.330)
Logged GDPPC −2.369
(13.324)
∆ Exchange Rate 6.369
(15.608)






Export (% of GDP) 0.136
(0.570)
Import (% of GDP) −0.286
(0.609)
Number of BITs 0.515
(1.277)
Observations 10,990 8,804 3,430 7,560
R2 0.155 0.162 0.139 0.201
Adjusted R2 0.150 0.155 0.127 0.194
Fixed Effects C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y
Note: C=country, I=industry, Y=year ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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